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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the literature that analyses the term structure of interest rates
from a macro-finance perspective.
Chapter 1 of this thesis provides a structural interpretation behind the decline in the US
term spread’s predictive power with regards to future real output growth. Our analysis is
conducted through use of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium New-Keynesian model
that is estimated on both macroeconomic and financial data. Our findings indicate that it
is changes to the composition of shocks hitting the US economy that has caused the term
spread, through the endogenous monetary policy response, to cease being a useful indicator
of future output growth.
Chapter 2 examines the importance of shifts in the expectations of agents in the form
of “news shocks” in explaining the variation in the slope of the term structure of interest
rates. The methodology employed in this chapter is a medium-scale Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium model that has been augmented to permit a role for both anticipated
and unanticipated components in the usual array of structural shocks. In order to quantify
the relative importance of each structural shock, the model is estimated via Bayesian methods
on US data. We find the anticipated Total Factor Productivity shock to be quantitatively
unimportant in driving US term spread fluctuations since, conditional on this shock, our
model is unable to generate the observed leading procyclical movement of the spread found
in the data. We do, however, find a limited role for the anticipated wage mark-up shock
in that it accounts for a small share of the variation in consumption, hours and real wages.
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However, it is the unanticipated shocks that account for the major share of variation in the
term spread as well as other key macro aggregates.
The third and final chapter of this thesis examines the ability of the industry-standard
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model to jointly explain both macroeconomic and
financial data. We compute a second-order solution to our model in order to derive predic-
tions for risk premia on equities and real, nominal and corporate bonds. Our central result
is that by appending the Smets and Wouters (2007) model with Epstein-Zin preferences,
long-run nominal risk and a credit market friction, we are able to generate realistic moments
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Preface
The term structure of interest rates may be viewed as a function that relates the rate of
interest to term to maturity. The macroeconomist’s view posits that the term structure is
largely determined by the expected path of future short-term interest rates, which in turn
are influenced by expected deviations in output and inflation from trend. Consequently,
long-term bond prices are then seen to covey information that is useful for agents in for-
mulating their savings and investment choices, but also to Central banks when formulating
their monetary policy decisions.
Long-term bond prices also contain term premia which reflects the relative riskiness of in-
vesting in long-term bonds as opposed to rolling over bonds of a shorter maturity. It is
typical in most macroeconomic analyses of the term structure, however, to ignore the risk-
implications of long-term bond investment and restrict term premia to zero. By contrast, the
finance literature is geared towards providing a statistically valid fit for bond prices across
the term structure such that term premia is explicitly modelled. This is often achieved in a
no-arbitrage framework that models bond yields as a linear function of a few latent factors.
By definition, these latent factors are unobservable and therefore lacking in macroeconomic
content. As such, the canonical finance model often precludes the ability to attribute move-
ments in risk premiums to changes in the macroeconomic environment.
The macro-finance approach to term structure modelling seeks to overcome the issues associ-
ated with the dichotomous modelling of interest rates by adding macroeconomic content into
statistically relevant term structure models. This thesis is related to a particular strand of
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macro-finance research that examines the bond-pricing implications of Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. Typically, empirical validation of DSGE models is as-
sessed on their ability to fit macroeconomic moments, while their ability to explain key asset
price facts is often overlooked. From a theoretical perspective this is problematic, since it is
through asset markets in which consumption and investment are allocated across time and
states of nature (Cochrane, 2005). Consequently, the need for a coherent framework that
is able to simultaneously explain macroeconomic and financial data is justified on strong
theoretical foundations.
This thesis is composed of three chapters, all of which model the influence of the macroe-
conomy on the term structure within the context of a New-Keynesian DSGE model.
The first chapter is related to those analyses exploring the predictive capacity of the term
structure with regards to future real output growth. Numerous studies have found the term
spread, the difference between a long and short nominal Government bond rate, to be a
reliable indicator of future economic activity. In the case of the US, however, the predictive
content of the term spread has diminished significantly from the mid-1980s till the present
period. In light of this finding, Chapter 1 aims to provide a structural interpretation behind
the decline in the US term spread’s forecasting ability. The key conclusion of Chapter 1 is
that it is a shift in the relative importance of shocks driving US term spread fluctuations
that is the most likely explanation in accounting for the decline in its predictive power.
Expectational shocks pertaining to future improvements in Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) have been found to be an important driver in the variation of the US term spread
(Kurmann and Otrok, 2013a). Chapter 2 provides new evidence to the debate on which
shocks are most important in accounting for US term spread fluctuations. To this end, we
estimate a medium-scale DSGE model on US data in which the structural shocks have all
been augmented to include both anticipated and unanticipated components. In general,
we find the anticipated shocks to be quantitatively unimportant in driving US term spread
13
Chapter 1
fluctuations since, conditional on these shocks, our model is unable to generate the observed
leading procylical movement of the term spread found in the data. Our model does, however,
find a limited role for the anticipated wage mark-up shock in that it accounts for a small
share of the variation in consumption, hours and real wages. However, it is the unanticipated
shocks that account for the major share of variation in the term spread as well as other key
macro aggregates.
Chapter 3 of this thesis is the result of joint work with my supervisor Dr. Katsuyuki
Shibayama. In this Chapter, we examined the ability of the workhorse medium-scale model
to explain both macroeconomic and financial series. So that the role of risk can be properly
evaluated, we compute a second-order solution to our model in order to demonstrate how risk
premia on equities and real, nominal and corporate bonds is influenced by the macroeconomy.
Our central finding is that by appending the Smets and Wouters (2007) model with Epstein-
Zin preferences, long-run nominal risk in the form of a time-varying inflation target and a
credit market friction, we are able to generate realistic moments for the financial series under
consideration without distorting the fit of our business cycle statistics.
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Chapter 1
The Decline in the Predictive Power
of the US Term Spread: A Structural
Interpretation
1.1 Introduction
Following Burns and Mitchell (1935), macroeconomists have long recognised that spot inter-
est rates contain useful information concerning the state of the business cycle. Short-term
spot rates are predominantly influenced by the monetary authority and are set in accordance
with its goals of output and inflation stabilisation. The macroeconomist’s view, which as-
sumes the expectations hypothesis1, posits that long-term spot rates are then determined
by expectations of future short-term interest rates which will in turn be influenced by ex-
pected deviations in inflation and output from trend. The information implied by the term
structure, therefore, carries important practical implications, such that it is extensively mon-
itored by policy makers and market participants when formulating their respective policy
1The expectations hypothesis implies that the expected excess return on long-term bonds over short-
term bonds is constant over time and dependent upon maturity. In its purest form, the pure expectations




Kessel (1965) documented that the gap between short and long-term spot interest rates, the
term spread, tended to move with the business cycle. The authour noted that the term
spread tended to narrow prior to a slowdown in economic activity and widen prior to an
economic expansion. Indeed, since the inclusion of interest rate spreads in Stock and Watson
(1989)’s index of leading indicators2, studies evaluating the forecasting power of the term
spread has been an active area of empirical research. The seminal contributions of Laurent
et al. (1989), Chen (1991) and Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) find evidence within a linear
regression framework that the US term spread helps predict growth in real output3. More-
over, using a discrete-choice model, Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) find additional evidence
of the term spread to be a reliable forecaster of US recessions4.
However, in the case of the US, the accuracy of the term spread in predicting real activity
has significantly diminished from the mid-1980s (Dotsey, 1998; Estrella et al., 2003; Bordo
and Haubrich, 2004, 2008). In light of this finding, this paper seeks to provide a structural
interpretation behind the decline in the predictive power of the US term spread5. As such,
our work is therefore directly related to those analyses examining the theoretical basis for
the term spread’s predictive power.
Our paper is most similar to Feroli (2004) in that our analysis considers a DSGE model to elu-
cidate the procyclical nature of the term spread in terms of the structure of the economy and
the functional form of Central bank’s monetary reaction function. However, we differentiate
our analysis by using our model to pin down an appropriate explanation among competing
theories behind the term spread’s structural break in predictive power. For instance, one
2Specifically, the authours include information on the difference between the 10 year Treasury bond rate
and 3-month bill rate and the difference between the 6-month commercial paper rate and 6-month Treasury
bill rate.
3See Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994), Bernard and Gerlach (1998) and Estrella and Mishkin (1997) for
evidence outside of the US on the term spread’s ability to forecast real output.
4See Wheelock et al. (2009) for a comprehensive survey on the various techniques used in the literature
to evaluate the predictive power of the term spread.
5Strictly speaking, our analysis is a model-fitting exercise in which we attempt to uncover why the
empirical relation between the term spread and future rates of output growth has diminished.
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contribution of our paper is to investigate whether the presence of time-varying term premia
(TVTP) may have been a contributory factor behind the reduction in the term spread’s
predictive power. As discussed by Dewachter et al. (2014), the presence of TVTP not only
invalidates the expectations hypothesis, but, in the content of macroeconomic forecasting,
may potentially obfuscate the information content of the term spread. This is particularly
relevant in the instance that changes in the quantity of term premia demanded by investors
are less connected to future US macroeconomic developments and are more likely the re-
sult of idiosyncratic developments unique to the US bond market6. Of course, to properly
evaluate the role of TVTP in our analysis a decomposition of the term spread is warranted.
We thus use our model to decompose the term spread so that the risk-adjusted term spread
can then be regressed on future output. We find, however, limited support for the TVTP
explanation in that the risk-adjusted term spread is reported to be statistically insignificant
in that part of our sample characterised by a loss in the term spread’s leading properties.
As discussed by Bordo and Haubrich (2004), the accuracy of the spread’s predictive power
will also be affected by changes in the conduct of monetary policy and the structure of the
economy. In order to examine if changes in these features played a role in the decline in
term spread predictive power, we estimate a medium scale New-Keynesian DSGE model
over two sub-samples. The first sub-sample is characterised by high predictive power in the
term spread while the second sub-sample is distinguished by a loss of predictive power. We
then compare our sub-sample estimates to highlight several features of both the structure of
the US economy and in the operating behaviour of the Federal Reserve that may have been
conducive to the high predictive power present in the first sub-sample. Our model is then
used to evaluate the role of these features by generating various counterfactual paths for the
term spread which are then regressed on future output. The results of our counterfactual
analysis reveal that it is predominantly changes to the relative importance of shocks in ac-
6For example, the Global Saving Glut and increased regulatory pressures forcing pension companies to
hold long-term US paper have both contributed to the recent compression in the 10 year US term premium.




counting for US fluctuations which, through the endogenous monetary policy response, has
impaired the link between the term spread and future macroeconomic developments in recent
times. Specifically, the use of a structural correlation decomposition reveals that shocks to
the marginal efficiency of investment account for the dominant share of the unconditional
correlation between the term spread and future output growth in that part of our sample
characterised by a loss of preditive power. Conditional on this shock, we observe an instanta-
neous decrease in the term spread response despite positive increases in future growth rates
of real output. Clearly, such responses are inconsistent with the notion that the term spread
is a leading procyclical variable. In this regard, our results are therefore supportive of those
papers finding the role of systematic monetary policy to be the decisive factor behind the
term spread’s forecasting capacity (Bernanke, 1990; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Smets and
Tsatsaronis, 1997; Jardet, 2004; Kurmann and Otrok, 2013a).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the competing theories
put forward to elucidate the leading properties of the term spread. In Section 1.3 we provide
a rough sketch of the details of our model, leaving Section 1.4 to discuss the details of the
estimation procedure. Section 1.5 then provides details on how our estimation procedure
can be used to decompose the term spread. Sections 1.6 and 1.7 report and discuss the main
results of our paper. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Foundations
Typically, in testing the term spread’s ability to forecast the cumulative growth in future
output, the extant literature has opted for estimating a linear regression of the form:
(400/k)
(




= α0 + α1SP
D
t + εt (1.1)
where Y Dt+k denotes the stock of real GDP at quarter t + k and SP
D
t represents the term
spread, which is constructed by subtracting the 3-month Treasury bill rate from the 10-year
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Treasury bond rate. To highlight previous results we estimate (1.1) on US quarterly data
spanning from 1966:1 - 2006:4. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 1.1 and
are indicative of two key regularities:
(i) The sign of the estimates are consistent with the view that an increase (decrease) in
the term spread implies a future expansion (slowdown) in economic activity.
(ii) The predictive capacity of the term spread is sensitive to the sample period considered.
For example, the estimates obtained over the 1966:1 - 1979:2 reveal the term spread to
be a reliable indicator of future output growth as evidenced by both highly significant
coefficient estimates and also sizeable R̄2 values. The estimates reported over the
1984:1 - 2006:4 period, however, are all insignificant at the 5% level, implying a decline
in the predictive power of the term spread in recent years7.
Interestingly, despite the plethora of empirical evidence supporting these stylised facts, anal-
yses discussing the theoretical basis for why the term spread should lead developments in
output are relatively limited in comparison.
A notable exception is that of Harvey (1988) who argues that the predictive content of the
term spread pertains to the real term structure. Based on a consumption-smoothing type
argument, the expectation of a future recession will prompt agents to invest in long-term real
bonds to ensure a pay-off in the downturn. It is the additional demand for these bonds that
causes the real term spread to narrow prior to the recession, particularly if the investment
is funded through selling short-term financial instruments. Of course such an explanation
is problematic in that the bulk of empirical evidence concerns the nominal term structure.
As argued by Benati and Goodhart (2008), the extent to which developments in the real
term structure transmit through to its nominal analogue depend crucially on the stochastic
properties of inflation, thereby stressing the importance of the underlying monetary regime.
7Indeed, the results of a Bai and Perron (1998) structural break test on (1.1) for k = 4 (results not
reported) are supportive of a break in the empirical relationship between the term spread and future real
GDP growth in 1984. Jardet (2004) also reports similar results.
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Shocks under a credible regime, for example, would likely see long-term inflation expecta-
tions to remain relatively anchored and therefore less volatile in comparison to short-term
inflation expectations. Consequently, the low persistence of inflation implicit under such a
regime raises the potential for shifts in the nominal term spread to add noise to the pre-
dictive signals emanating from the real term spread. In their empirical analysis, however,
Benati and Goodhart (2008) find limited support for the consumption-smoothing explana-
tion. Their conclusion is based on the finding that changes in the predictive power of the
US term spread do not conform with the variation in US inflation persistence as would be
dictated by the consumption-smoothing explanation.
Alternatively, the other leading explanation behind the term spread’s predictive power is
one pertaining to the endogenous response of monetary policy. For instance, in the presence
of nominal rigidities, expansionary monetary policy lowers both nominal and real rates pro-
viding stimulus for economic activity. If, in response to the monetary stimulus, agents raise
their inflation expectations, then long-term interest rates will rise causing the term spread to
steepen prior to the expansion in output. By a symmetric argument, a monetary tightening
will see long-rates fall relatively less than short-rates causing the term spread to narrow
or possibly invert prior to the contraction in real output. An implication of this theory is
that (1.1) would in fact be spurious, since it is the information encoded in the short rate
which is driving both subsequent output growth and the term spread. Such an assertion is
routinely tested in the literature which proposes augmenting (1.1) to include some proxy of
the monetary policy stance:
(400/k)
(








t + υt (1.2)
where FFRDt denotes the effective federal funds rate. According to this explanation the
inclusion of FFRDt should render β1 statistically insignificant in (1.2). As made clear from
Table 1.2, over the earlier sub-sample we observe a reduction in both the coefficient estimates
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and respective t statistics for β1 relative to α1. Moreover, we find that the β2 is highly sig-
nificant, perhaps suggestive that the short-rate was a key factor in accounting for the term
spread’s predictive power over this sub-sample. Over the full sample, however, we observe
that β1 retains its significance at the 5% level for all horizons and therefore casting doubt
on the notion that the predictive power of the term spread is derived solely from the stance
of monetary policy8.
One interpretation of why the term spread contains additional information over and above
that contained in the policy rate is that it is expectations of future monetary policy not
captured by the short rate which are central to the spread’s predictive power (Feroli, 2004;
Estrella, 2005). The theoretical contributions of these authours stress the importance of the
Central bank’s objectives when evaluating the ability of the term spread to forecast output
growth. For instance, the more responsive the monetary reaction function is to output devi-
ations the better the term spread should forecast output growth. This interpretation ties in
nicely with the observation that the US monetary reaction function has changed significantly
since the appointment of Paul Volcker as Federal Reserve Chairman in 1979. Indeed, Clarida
et al. (2000) document that the reaction function characterising the Volcker-Greenspan era
has tilted in favour of a relatively greater preference for inflation stabilisation, coinciding
with that part of our sample characterised by a loss of predictive power in the term spread.
Finally, the presence of term premia may account for the additional forecasting power con-
tained in the term spread. The analyses of Hamilton and Kim (2000) and Favero et al. (2005)
have provided reduced form evidence that in certain sub-samples term premia positively leads
real output growth. It is therefore possible that the predictive power of the spread in excess
of that implied by the short rate may be coming from changes in the quantity of term premia
demanded by investors.




1.3 The Model Economy
The modelling framework used in our paper borrows from the analysis of Smets and Wouters
(2007)9. A list of the linearised equilibrium equations as well as a description of the deep
parameters used in this model are presented in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 respectively. Within our
framework, the predictive properties of the term spread are a natural consequence of two
assumptions present in our model. First, we assume that long-term bond yields are priced
in accordance with the pure expectations hypothesis10. Second, as is standard in closing
the New-Keynesian model, we assume that the Central Bank operates in accordance with a

































Where rMt,(n) denotes the yield on an n-period nominal bond at time t. Moreover, in the
interest of clarity, we differentiate between variables obtained in the data and those variables
generated by our model by using supercripts ‘D’ and ‘M ’ respectively. From (1.3), the
yield on a long-term bond is equal to the expected path of future short-term interest rates.
Moreover, from equation (1.4), the level of the short-term interest rate is a function of the
macroeconomy and will be set in accordance with the stabilisation policy employed by the
Central Bank. Taken together, these equations imply that the difference between a long and
short-term interest rate, the term spread, will contain the expectations of agents pricing in
their expected paths for future inflation and output over the relevant horizon.
9For more details, the reader is referred to their original paper and the accompanying appendix to this
paper which can be downloaded from the authour’s website.
10As discussed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), a first-order approximation of our model requires
the certainty equivalence principle to hold in order to ensure a unique solution. Term premia is there-





Prior to the estimation our model, we calibrate a subset of parameters that are notoriously
difficult to identify in the literature. In particular, we set the rate of capital depreciation,
δ, to 0.025, implying an annual depreciation rate of 10%. We fix the steady state wage
mark-up, φw, to 1.5 and the steady state Govt’ spending-output ratio to 0.18. Finally, we fix
the curvature of the Kimball goods market aggregator, ǫp, and the Kimball labour market























































In keeping with Smets and Wouters (2007), we include information on: the log difference
of real consumption, the log difference of real output, the log difference of real wages, the
log difference of real investment, the log of hours worked, the log difference of the GDP
deflator and the federal funds rate. A key addition to our model is that we also include
the term spread in the measurement equation, which we construct by taking the difference
between the 10-year Treasury bond rate and the 3-month Treasury bill rate. In a similar
vein to Smets and Wouters (2007), we estimate our model over a full sample period from
1964:1 - 2006:4, and then subsequently over two sub-sample periods: 1964:1 - 1979:2 and
1982:1 - 2006:4. The sub-sample estimations are motivated on the basis that there is a
marked difference in the predictive power of the term spread between these two periods.
Comparison of parameter estimates, therefore, will identify potential explanations for the
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instability in the term spread’s predictive power. The measurement equation in which we

































































































































































































































where γ̄ = 100 · (γ − 1) denotes the trend growth rate of the economy, l̄ is the steady
state of hours worked, π̄ = 100 · (Π− 1) represents the steady state rate of inflation, r̄ =
100 · (γσcβ−1Π− 1) represents the steady state nominal interest rate and c̄ denotes the level
of the term spread in steady state. Furthermore, we attach a measurement error, ηmt , onto
the measurement equation associated with the term spread, the motivation for doing so is
discussed in greater detail in the subsequent section.
Given that the model used in our analysis is a close variant of the Smets and Wouters (2007)
model, our prior elicitation strategy also follows the one employed in their paper. As such,
we refer the reader to Smets and Wouters (2007) for a comprehensive review of the prior
elicitation strategy used in both papers. One parameter, however, that is absent from Smets
and Wouters (2007)’s analysis is the constant that governs the term spread in the steady
state, c̄. We assume that the prior for this parameter is normally distributed with a mean
0.25 and a standard error 0.10,
As to be expected, our full sample estimates, presented in Table 1.4, are similar to those
reported in the original Smets and Wouters (2007) paper. Any differences between our
estimates may be attributed to the extended data series and the addition of the term spread
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in the measurement equation. Moreover, from Figure 1.1, our estimation results reveal that
all parameters are identified by our data set. Comparing the estimates between the two
sub-samples reveals a number of significant observations:
(i) The variances of the exogenous shocks, excluding the wage mark-up shock, appear to
have fallen in the second sub-sample, suggesting that the composition of shocks hitting
the economy has changed between the two sub-samples.
(ii) We also report an increase in the variance of the measurement error in the second
sub-sample, indicative of a worsening in model fit for the term spread over this period.
(iii) The monetary reaction coefficients also appear to differ between the two sub-samples.
For example, the latter sub-sample is characterised by a greater emphasis on stabilising
inflation deviations relative to stabilising deviations in output. In this regard, our
findings are supportive of, among others, Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Taylor (1999),
Clarida et al. (2000) and Cogley and Sargent (2005) who find significant time variation
in the monetary policy rule employed by the Federal Reserve. Indeed, these authours
estimate the monetary policy rules of Fed chairmen Paul Volcker (1979Q3 - 1987Q2)
and Alan Greenspan (1987Q3 - 2006Q1) to be considerably more aggressive in their
responses to inflation than that of the rule estimated under Arthur Burns (1970Q1
- 1978Q1). We do, however, report similar estimates for the interest rate smoothing
parameter, ρr, over the two sub-samples.
(iv) A final observation is that the slope of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) is
estimated to be flatter in the latter sub-sample11.




1.5 Decomposing the Term Spread
The discussion so far attributes the term spread’s predictive power to the information con-
tent implicit in the expected path of future short-term interest rates. Practically, this is
problematic in that it is conditional on the basis that the expectations hypothesis is sup-
ported empirically. Notable contributions from Fama and Bliss (1987) and Campbell and
Shiller (1991), however, have rejected the expectations hypothesis in favour of finding time-
varying term premia which may distort the information content contained in the term spread.
It is therefore appropriate to use our model to decompose the term spread into these two






























The first term on the RHS of (1.6) is consistent with the expectations hypothesis and reflects
the market’s views on the future path of the short-term interest rate. The second term
denotes term premia which reflects investors’ views on the relative riskiness of investing in
long-term bonds. From (1.3), it follows that the second term on the RHS of (1.6) is equal
to zero as is consistent with the pure expectations hypothesis. A decomposition of the term
spread is therefore necessary to isolate the component pertaining to changes in expectations.
In what follows, we provide an overview of how our methodology provides a convenient way
of decomposing the term spread.
By construction, the pure expectations hypothesis is a natural implication of estimating a
first-order approximation of our model. The smoothed estimate of the term spread generated
by our model will therefore be driven exclusively by changes in the expected path of the
policy rate12. Conversely, those term spread fluctuations in the data that our model is
12A pertinent point raised by De Graeve et al. (2009) is that a rigorous representation of the economy is
required in order to accurately price the expectational component of the term spread. The use of the Smets
and Wouters (2007) model in our analysis seems suitable in this regard since it has been shown to forecast
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unable to account for will be reflected through the variance of the measurement error which,
in principle, should serve as a proxy for term premia. The decomposition of the 10 year term

















To assess the validity of our decomposition technique, Figure 1.2 plots the time series esti-
mate of our measurement error alongside alternative estimates of the 10 year term premium
commonly quoted in the literature13.
Inspection of Figure 1.2 reveals that the measurement error does capture the salient fea-
tures of these alternative series. Indeed, further evidence of co-movement is presented in
Table 1.6, where the first column reports the correlation coefficients between the measure-
ment error and the alternative series. Reassuringly, we report high correlation coefficients
over our sample ranging from 0.74 to 0.8414. Moreover, when the sample is split from 1982
onwards, reflecting that period in which the term spread has lost predictive power, the corre-
lation coefficients all increase. Although rudimentary, Figure 1.2 and Table 1.6 provide some
evidence that our decomposition method is in keeping with other techniques and therefore
seems suitable for our point of analysis.
key macroeconomic series to a similar standard to that of Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR).
13The “VAR” estimate of the term premium is based on a trivariate vector autorgression (VAR) comprised
of the unemployment rate, the inflation rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate. The VAR is then used
to project an estimate of the risk-neutral long rate. The term premium is then calculated by subtracting
the VAR-based risk neutral rate from the observed rate. Our method follows a similar approach to the
VAR measure in that we also use our model to project forward an estimate of risk-neutral long rate. The
measurement error in our analysis is used to capture the difference between the risk-neutral rate and the
observed long-term rate. This may explain why our measure and the VAR measure are highly correlated
due to the similarity in approaches. However, relative to the atheoretical VAR measure, our estimate of the
risk-neutral long rate is obtained under explicit optimisation of the consumption-Euler equation. The term
premium estimates of both the “KW” and “CP” measures are obtained using affine term structure models.
Under these class of models, the term premium is determined by latent factors which, by definition, lack
economic interpretation.
14Principal component analysis reveals that the first principal component, denoted by λ1 in Table 1.6,
captures 95% of the variation in these three other estimates and is therefore representative of developments
in the 10 year term premium more generally. We take further confidence in the finding that the correlation




1.6.1 Time-Varying Term Premia
A key observation from Table 1.5 is that our proxy for term premia, the measurement error,
is relatively more volatile in the latter part of the sample15. This may also be interpreted
as a decline in the extent to which the expectations hypothesis can account for term spread
fluctuations in the data over this sub-sample. This, however, is problematic for our investi-
gation in that the theoretical basis of why the spread leads output growth pertains to the
expectational component. Furthermore, since there is no reason to suspect that the reduced
form evidence showing term premia to lead output growth to remain stable over time, then
any instability in this relationship may ultimately cause developments in term premia to
obfuscate the forecasting power of the spread. In this sub-section, we investigate whether
the presence of time-varying term premia may have been a contributory factor behind the
decline in the predictive power of the term spread. To this end, we regress the cumulative
growth rate of future real GDP on both components of the 10 year term spread16:
(400/k)
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t + υt (1.8)
Table 1.7 contains the results of this exercise which, for comparative purposes, are presented
alongside the estimates obtained for equation (1.1). Focussing first on the earlier sub-sample,
a number of observations are worth discussing. First, and perhaps to be expected, we report
higher t-statistics for the expectational component, γ1, relative to the raw term spread
coefficient, α1, reflecting greater significance in these estimates. It is, however, interesting to
note that the size of the coefficient estimates of γ1 are strikingly similar to α1 at all forecasting
horizons. Second, and complimentary to the findings of Hamilton and Kim (2000) and Favero
et al. (2005), we report statistically significant and positive coefficient estimates for the
15The standard deviation of the measurement error is denoted by σm.
16For consistency, we use the same real GDP series as that used in estimating (1).
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term premia component.17 Third, the results of a Wald test indicate that the contributions
of the expectational and term premia components are indeed statistically different from
one another.18 Moreover, we can conclude that it is the contribution of the expectational
component that is the most important factor in predicting future output growth, since we
report both higher coefficient estimates and respective t-statistics for γ1 relative to γ2. In
this regard, our results support the findings of Rudebusch et al. (2007) and Rosenberg and
Maurer (2008).
For the later sub-sample, our results indicate that, in spite of decomposing the term spread,
the expectational component is statistically insignificant. We report similar findings for the
term premia component, although it is found to be marginally significant for a forecasting
horizon of 2,6 and 8 quarters. Our findings for this sub-sample suggest that the presence of
term premia has not been blurring the information content of the term spread and therefore
cannot account for the decline in predictive power.
1.6.2 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, we use counterfactual analysis to test if the instability in certain sub-sets of
parameters may be able to account for the term spread’s poor forecasting power over the
latter sub-sample. We perform all our counterfactual simulations through use of DYNARE’s
‘simult’ function:
tsi = simult (ȳ, dri, x) (1.9)
As inputs to the function we provide the decision rules of a calibrated model, dri, a shock
matrix for which the model is simulated on, x, and a vector of initial values for which to begin
the simulation, ȳ. As an output, the function will return the time series of an endogenous
variable which, in the interest of our analysis, will be the expectational component of the
17Although we report marginal significance in the case of k = 2 and k = 8.
18Hamilton and Kim (2000) also report similar findings.
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term spread, tsi. Furthermore, the subscript i references the counterfactual experiment.
For comparative purposes, we define the benchmark case as the expectational component
generated by using a model calibrated to the first sub-sample mode estimates, simulated
on the first sub-sample smoothed shock estimates. Motivated by the results of our sub-
sample estimations, we then attempt to account for the fall in predictive power by changing
certain sub-sets of parameters in our benchmark model. We then simulate our model and
subsequently regress the respective expectational component on future real GDP growth as
before:
(400/k) (lnYt+k − lnYt) = α0,i + α1,itsi + εt,i (1.10)
A key finding from Table 1.5 is that the monetary reaction coefficients appear to differ be-
tween the two sub-samples. Specifically, the latter sub-sample is characterised by a greater
emphasis on stabilising inflation deviations relative to stabilising deviations in output which,
as discussed, is a finding that has been well documented for the Federal reserve. Our anal-
ysis, however, is concerned with the implications for the spread’s predictive power in light
of changes to the monetary policy rule. The motivation for such an experiment is based on
the theoretical contributions of Feroli (2004) and Estrella (2005). These authours discuss
how the predictive signals provided by the term spread should become more accurate as the
Central bank becomes increasingly sensitive to output deviations when formulating policy.
Our sub-sample estimates are consistent with this prediction in that we estimate a reaction
function that has become relatively less sensitive to output deviations in that part of our
sample characterised by a loss of predictive power. To examine whether the change in the
monetary policy rule can account for the decline in predictive power, we change only the
monetary reaction coefficients in our benchmark calibrated model to the estimates obtained
in the second sub-sample. From Table 1.8, relative to the benchmark model, it seems that
in spite of allowing for the shift in Fed operating behaviour, the expectational component
remains statistically significant. Therefore, our reduced-form evidence leads us to conclude
that the change in the monetary policy rule alone is not able to account for the decline in
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predictive power. We do, however, report lower adjusted R-squared values under a reac-
tion function characterised by a relatively greater sensitivity to inflation deviations at all
forecasting horizons. Our results are therefore suggestive that the monetary policy rule is a
factor in influencing the spread’s predictive power and thus provides some empirical support
for the analyses of Feroli (2004) and Estrella (2005).
A second observation from our sub-sample estimates is that the slope of the NKPC is esti-
mated to be flatter in the latter sub-sample. While the extant literature exhibits a conflicting
set of results over the time variation in the Phillips curve slope,19 our finding is at least con-
sistent with several notable analyses20 (Atkeson and Ohanian, 2001; Staiger et al., 2001;
Roberts, 2006; Kuttner and Robinson, 2010). The implication of a flatter NKPC slope is
that for a given deviation in output we observe less transmission through to inflation. There-
fore, there is a case that a flatter NKPC slope, coupled with a greater weight on inflation
in the Fed’s reaction function may reduce the predictive power of the term spread. We test
this by changing only the relevant slope parameter values in our benchmark model to those
estimates obtained in the second sub-sample. Table 1.9 presents the reduced-form evidence
from this simulation. Our results make clear that the change in the slope of the NKPC is not
able to account for the decline in predictive power, since the respective expectational com-
ponent remains statistically significant. We do, however, report lower adjusted R-squared
values under a flatter NKPC slope at all forecasting horizons.
A final observation from our sub-sample estimates is that the variances of the exogenous
shocks, excluding the wage mark-up shock, appear to have fallen in the second sub-sample21,
suggesting that the composition of shocks hitting the US economy has changed between the
two sub-samples. Such a result warrants further investigation upon consideration of the
numerous studies that have posited the importance of systematic monetary policy in ex-
19See, for example, Fitzgerald et al. (2013) who discusses how the variety of functional forms for the
Phillips curve, the data used in its estimation and the horizon for which future inflation is considered, all
contribute to the wide estimates of the time variation in the slope.
20See Kuttner and Robinson (2010) for an overview of the possible explanations behind the flattening of
the US Phillips curve.
21Similar findings are also reported in Smets and Wouters (2007).
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plaining the term spread’s predictive power (Bernanke, 1990; Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991;
Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Smets and Tsatsaronis, 1997; Dotsey, 1998; Jardet, 2004; Kur-
mann and Otrok, 2013a). This is because any changes to the relative importance of shocks
driving US business-cycle fluctuations will imply different policy responses that may or may
not result in a term spread that positively leads output growth. We investigate whether
changes to the US shock composition can account for the decline in the spread’s predictive
power by simulating our benchmark model on the smoothed shock estimates obtained for
the second sub-sample. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 1.10. Conditional
on the second sub-sample shock estimates, the resultant expectational coefficients are all sta-
tistically insignificant. As such, we also observe a significant fall in the adjusted R-squared
values for all forecasting horizons under this counterfactual exercise. Our reduced-form ev-
idence is therefore indicative of the impact that changes in shock composition have played
on the time variation in the US term spread’s predictive power.
1.7 Structural Correlation Decomposition
In light of the previous section, we aim here to provide a structural interpretation of these
findings by use of a structural correlation decomposition. Specifically, we use our struc-
tural model to decompose the unconditional correlation between the term spread and future
growth rates in output to each of the structural shocks.22 Furthermore, the decomposition
is conducted over the same two sub-samples as before so that we can assess how the contri-
bution of each shock has changed between the two sub-samples.
Table 1.11 reports the results of the decompositions. The second column of the table reports
the unconditional correlation between the term spread and various growth rates in real out-
put and, as to be expected, the model returns relatively higher correlation coefficients for the
earlier sub-sample. Over the earlier sub-sample, it is clear that the monetary policy shock,
22See Andrle (2012) for a detailed note on how to decompose the correlations of a linear state-space model
into the individual contributions of each exogenous innovation.
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ηr, accounts for the major share of correlation at a forecasting horizon of 2 quarters. To
gain insight into this result, Figure 1.3 presents selected impulse response functions implied
by a positive monetary policy shock. The exogenous increase in the policy rate causes the
term spread to decrease on impact, the response of output, however, displays a hump-shaped
response due to the real frictions in the model. The output response is key here since, as the
output growth horizon is increased, the inertia impacts the respective responses in two ways.
First, we see not only a smaller decrease on impact but, more importantly, the turning point
of the growth response begins to precede that of the term spreads. This explains why the
model attributes a smaller share of correlation to the monetary policy shock as the growth
horizon is increased.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that in the second sub-sample the contribution of monetary
policy shocks, both in absolute and relative terms, has significantly fallen. One potential ex-
planation behind this result may be related to the lack of credibility of the Federal Reserve in
its commitment to achieving low and stable inflation in our earlier sub-sample (Goodfriend,
1993). Appealing to the Fisher equation, long-term rates are a function of inflation expecta-
tions, such that a monetary easing, for example, will prompt agents to revise their inflation
expectations upwards, which in turn contributes to the widening of the term spread. Indeed,
the change in inflation expectations are amplified in the absence of a credible commitment
to stabilise inflation and will therefore precipitate a more pronounced signal emanating from
the term spread prior to the monetary-induced change in output. Under this interpretation,
our findings may be seen as complimentary to those of Bordo and Haubrich (2004).
One other potential explanation behind the diminished contribution of monetary policy
shocks in our later sub-sample is the finding of several analyses to report the declining im-
pact of exogenous changes in monetary policy on output since the mid 1980s (Bernanke and
Mihov, 1998; Barth and Ramey, 2001; Boivin and Giannoni, 2006; Boivin et al., 2010). In
the instance that monetary policy shocks have a muted impact on future output growth, it
follows that the predictive capacity of the term spread will diminish.
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One final observation for this sub-sample is that the risk-premium shock23, ηb, accounts for
a major share of correlation at all growth horizons. From Figure 1.4, the risk premium
shock encourages agents to bring forward consumption and investment causing inflationary
pressures to build. Consequently, the endogenous response of the Central bank causes the
term spread to sharply decrease on impact. It is clear from Figure 1.4 that the initial de-
crease in the term spread leads the negative realised growth rate in output at all horizons.
Furthermore, contrast to the monetary policy shock, the turning point of all growth rate
responses never precede that of the term spreads due to the limited inertia in the output
response. This explains why the model attaches a large share of the correlation to the risk
premium shock at all horizons.
Similar to the monetary policy shock, the contribution of the risk-premium shock is found
to have fallen in both absolute and relative terms in our second sub-sample. As discussed by
Fisher (2015), the risk-premium shock in our analysis may be interpreted as a shock to the
demand for safe and liquid assets such as short-term debt issued by the US treasury. This
interpretation is particularly interesting in light of the policies geared towards deregulating
US financial markets in the 1980s. In particular, prior to the early 1980s, Regulation Q im-
posed interest rate ceilings on savings and time deposits held at commercial banks. Indeed,
Gilbert (1986) and Mertens (2008) show that throughout our earlier sub-sample of the 1960s
and 1970s, these interest rate ceilings were often binding24 and contributed to the large with-
drawals in said deposits from commercial banks observed over this period. Moreover, Cook
(1981) provides evidence that savers, in order to take advantage of higher market yields,
increased their demand for liquid short-term Treasury Bills by diverting their deposits into
money market funds25. By driving a wedge between the market rate and the rate offered
on household deposits, it is plausible that Regulation Q may be key to explaining why the
23As discussed in Smets and Wouters (2007), this shock introduces a wedge between the policy rate and
the return on assets held by the household.
24That is, the interest rate ceilings were lower than the return offered on market instruments.
25See Cook and Duffield (1979) for a discussion on the growth of money market funds in the late 1970s
that were established in order to placate the growing demand from savers to access market rates of return.
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risk-premium shock is estimated to be an important contributor to the correlation between
the spread and future output growth in our earlier sub-sample. Moreover, financial market
liberalisation and the subsequent repeal of Regulation Q in the 1980s, is also consistent with
the finding that the risk-premium shock has diminished in importance in our later second
sub-sample26.
In the case of the later sub-sample, it is clear that the relative importance of shocks driving
the correlation between the term spread and future output growth has shifted significantly.
In this part of our sample we observe that the investment shock, ηi dominates in accounting
for the correlation at all horizons over this sub-sample27. Indeed, this result is complimentary
to several other studies that report the significance of the investment shock in explaining US
business-cycle fluctuations (Greenwood et al., 1997, 2000; Fisher, 2006; Justiniano and Prim-
iceri, 2008; Justiniano et al., 2010). In particular, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) provide
evidence that changes in the volatility of the investment shock are key to understanding the
significant fall in the volatilities of key macroeconomic aggregates in the US since the late
1980s - the so called “Great Moderation” period. The investment shock exposited in these
class of models impacts the efficiency in which the final good is transformed into productive
capital. As these authours argue, if firms rely on external financing to purchase investment
goods, then it follows that the cost of external finance in addition to the efficiency in which
the financial sector intermediates credit, should be reflected through the variation in the in-
vestment shock. Consistent with this view, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) and Justiniano
et al. (2011) discuss how the liberalisation of US financial markets over this period has indeed
widened access to credit for households and firms. The importance our model attributes to
the investment shock over this period may therefore be picking up the impact of financial
26This is not only reflected in terms of its contribution to the spread-output growth correlation, but also
concerning the estimates of the parameters governing the process of this exogenous shock i.e. its persistence
and variance (see Table 5).




market deregulation on the allocation of credit to borrowers28.
We now ask - why did a shift of relative importance in favour of the investment shock con-
tribute to the decline in the term spread’s predictive power? From Figure 1.5, a positive
investment shock boosts the capital stock thereby causing output to increase in a persistent
and inertial manner29. Similarly, we observe a positively hump-shaped response for inflation
prompting the Central bank to gradually tighten policy, hence the inertia also observed in
the term spread response. It is striking to note that in spite of the term spread decreasing
on impact, realised output growth at all horizons is initially positive. Clearly, such responses
are inconsistent with a term spread that leads output growth and therefore supports our
reduced-form evidence in finding that changes to the relative importance of exogenous dis-
turbances is an important factor in accounting for the decline in the spread’s predictive
power.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper has provided a structural interpretation of the recent decline in the US term
spread’s forecasting capacity. In so doing, we have contributed to the theoretical debate on
why the term spread leads output growth. We first discounted the conjecture that time-
varying term premia may have been a factor in weakening the reliability of the spread as a
leading indicator. This was made apparent after a decomposition of the term spread revealed
the risk-adjusted term spread to be statistically insignificant when regressed on future output.
Through the use of counterfactual analysis we found that a shift in the relative importance of
shocks driving US term spread fluctuations to be the most likely explanation in accounting for
the decline in its predictive power. Indeed, a structural correlation decomposition revealed
that for the second sub-sample, the unconditional correlation between the spread and future
28Indeed, Bernanke et al. (1999) contend that the implication of models, such as ours, that do not explicitly
model financial frictions in the form of agency costs a la Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), is that such financial
effects will instead be captured by variation in the investment shock.




output growth is predominately driven by shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment.
Inspection of the respective impulse response functions, however, reveal that an investment
shock leads to an impact response that is inconsistent with the term spread positively leading




Table 1.1: Regression Analysis (I)
Equation (1.1)
Sample Period k α0 α1 R̄
2
1966:1 - 2006:4
2 1.83∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.17
(4.04) (4.14)
4 1.95∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.23
(4.40) (4.05)
6 2.14∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.23
(5.14) (3.93)
8 2.38∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.19
(6.52) (3.85)
1966:1 - 1979:2
2 1.69∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 0.32
(2.41) (4.10)
4 2.00∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 0.41
(2.86) (3.90)
6 2.40∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.33
(3.66) (3.74)
8 2.76∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.23
(5.18) (3.56)
1984:1 - 2006:4
2 2.57∗∗∗ 0.35 0.04
(4.27) (1.53)
4 2.63∗∗∗ 0.35 0.05
(4.00) (1.41)
6 2.50∗∗∗ 0.43∗ 0.10
(3.97) (1.76)
8 2.60∗∗∗ 0.38∗ 0.10
(4.56) (1.78)
Notes: a. In parantheses presented below the coefficient es-
timates we report the corresponding t-statistics. The stan-
dard errors used to compute the t-statistics have been ad-
justed via the methodology proposed by Newey and West
(1987) to correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
b. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%,













Table 1.2: Regression Analysis (II)
Equation (1.1) Equation (1.2)
Sample Period k α0 α1 R̄
2 β0 β1 β2 R̄
2
1966:1 - 2006:4
2 1.83∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.17 3.61∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗ −0.21∗∗ 0.22
(4.04) (4.14) (3.86) (2.45) (-1.98)
4 1.95∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.23 3.37∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗ −0.17∗ 0.28
(4.40) (4.05) (3.80) (2.56) (-1.84)
6 2.14∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.23 3.25∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗ −0.13 0.27
(5.14) (3.93) (3.69) (2.41) (-1.53)
8 2.38∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.19 3.21∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗ −0.10 0.22
(6.52) (3.85) (3.86) (2.26) (-1.19)
1966:1 - 1979:2
2 1.69∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 0.32 8.11∗∗∗ 0.68∗ −0.86∗∗∗ 0.52
(2.41) (4.10) (5.79) (1.87) (-4.86)
4 2.00∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 0.41 7.14∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗ 0.65
(2.86) (3.90) (5.23) (2.39) (-4.12)
6 2.40∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.33 6.30∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗ −0.55∗∗ 0.53
(3.66) (3.74) (4.25) (2.18) (-2.63)
8 2.76∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.23 5.51∗∗∗ 0.44 −0.40∗∗ 0.37
(5.18) (3.56) (4.40) (1.63) (-2.31)
1984:1 - 2006:4
2 2.57∗∗∗ 0.35 0.04 2.09∗∗ 0.40∗ 0.07 0.04
(4.27) (1.53) (2.47) (1.70) (0.48)
4 2.63∗∗∗ 0.35 0.05 2.05∗∗ 0.41 0.09 0.06
(4.00) (1.41) (2.36) (1.58) (0.40)
6 2.50∗∗∗ 0.43∗ 0.10 1.81∗∗ 0.49∗ 0.10 0.13
(3.97) (1.76) (2.10) (1.89) (1.11)
8 2.60∗∗∗ 0.38∗ 0.10 1.81∗∗ 0.45∗ 0.11 0.15
(4.56) (1.78) (2.29) (1.96) (1.47)
Notes: a. In parantheses presented below the coefficient estimates we report the corresponding t-statistics. The
standard errors used to compute the t-statistics have been adjusted via the methodology proposed by Newey
and West (1987) to correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
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(8) yt = φ
(
ηat + αk̄t + (1− α)lt
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Notes: a. Endogenous variables include: c, consumption, l, labour, r, nominal interest rate, π, inflation, i,
investment, q price of installed capital, rk, return on capital, zt, capacity utilisation rate, k, physical capital,
k̄, effective capital, w, real wage rate, y, output, m, real marginal costs.
b. Exogenous shocks include: ηb, wedge shock, ηi, marginal efficiency of investment shock, ηw, wage mark-
up shock, ηa, tfp shock, ηp, price mark-up shock, ηg, exogenous spending shock, ηr, interest rate shock.
c. As in Smets and Wouters (2007) the flexible-price economy is the economy pertaining to the absence of
mark-up shocks and flexible wages and prices. We denote the flexible-price counterpart of endogenous vari-
ables via the superscript “f”.
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Table 1.4: Full Sample Estimates: 1966Q1 - 2006Q4
Prior Posterior
Parameter Description Density Mean Std.dev. Mean 10th 90th
ϕ Investment adjustment cost N 4.00 1.50 5.89 4.26 7.58
σc Inverse I.E.S N 1.50 0.37 1.33 1.13 1.53
ιc Consumption habit B 0.70 0.10 0.73 0.66 0.79
ξw Calvo wage B 0.50 0.10 0.75 0.65 0.85
σl Elast. labour supply N 2.00 0.75 2.08 1.08 3.01
ξp Calvo prices B 0.50 0.10 0.69 0.61 0.77
ιw Wage indexation B 0.50 0.15 0.59 0.38 0.80
ιp Price indexation B 0.50 0.15 0.30 0.13 0.45
ψ Utilisation cost B 0.50 0.15 0.55 0.38 0.73
φ Fixed cost N 1.25 0.12 1.64 1.51 1.77
rπ Taylor rule inflation N 1.50 0.25 1.97 1.67 2.26
ρ Taylor rule smoothing N 0.75 0.10 0.81 0.76 0.85
ry Taylor rule output N 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.09
r∆y Taylor rule ∆ output N 0.12 0.05 0.22 0.18 0.27





Discount factor G 0.25 0.10 0.16 0.07 0.25
l̄ SS hours N 0.00 2.00 6.16 3.91 8.45
γ̄ Trend growth N 0.40 0.10 0.42 0.40 0.45
α Capital share N 0.30 0.05 0.20 0.17 0.22
c SS term spread N 0.25 0.10 0.25 0.12 0.38
κ NKPC slope - - - 0.01 - -
σa Std.Dev. TFP IG 0.10 2.00 0.45 0.41 0.49
σb Std.Dev. Risk premium IG 0.10 2.00 0.24 0.20 0.28
σg Std.Dev. Govt’ spending IG 0.10 2.00 0.52 0.47 0.56
σi Std.Dev. Inv-specific IG 0.10 2.00 0.42 0.35 0.49
σr Std.Dev. Monetary policy IG 0.10 2.00 0.24 0.21 0.26
σp Std.Dev. Price mark-up IG 0.10 2.00 0.14 0.12 0.16
σw Std.Dev. Wage mark-up IG 0.10 2.00 0.25 0.22 0.29
σm Std. Measurement U 2.00 2.00 0.71 0.65 0.78
ρa AR(1) TFP B 0.50 0.20 0.95 0.93 0.97
ρb AR(1) Risk premium B 0.50 0.20 0.23 0.08 0.36
ρg AR(1) Govt. B 0.50 0.20 0.97 0.96 0.99
ρi AR(1) Inv-specific B 0.50 0.20 0.73 0.64 0.82
ρr AR(1) Mon. Pol B 0.50 0.20 0.17 0.06 0.28
ρp AR(1) P.M up B 0.50 0.20 0.89 0.83 0.96
ρw AR(1) W.M up B 0.50 0.20 0.96 0.93 0.98
µp MA(1) P.M up B 0.50 0.20 0.75 0.62 0.88
µw MA(1) W.M up B 0.50 0.20 0.85 0.76 0.94
ρga AR(1) TFP/Govt. B 0.50 0.20 0.54 0.40 0.68
δ Depreciate rate - 0.025 - - - -
φw SS Wage mark-up - 1.50 - - - -
gy Govt’ spending/Output - 0.18 - - - -
ǫp Kimball price - 10.0 - - - -
ǫw Kimball wage - 10.0 - - - -
Notes: a. The posterior distributions are sampled by running two parallel chains of 250000 replica-
tions of the Metropolis Hastings algorithm. Convergence is checked by using the metrics provided
by Brooks and Gelman (1998).
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Table 1.5: Sub-Sample Estimates
Structural Parameters Shock Processes
1964Q1 - 1979Q2 1982Q1 - 2006Q4 1964Q1 - 1979Q2 1982Q1 - 2006Q4
Mode Std.Dev. Mode Std.Dev. Mode Std.Dev. Mode Std.Dev.
ϕ 4.67 1.06 6.71 1.14 σa 0.55 0.06 0.36 0.03
σc 1.23 0.13 1.56 0.13 σb 0.25 0.04 0.18 0.02
ιc 0.70 0.06 0.66 0.05 σg 0.53 0.05 0.40 0.03
ξw 0.80 0.06 0.72 0.09 σi 0.43 0.09 0.35 0.05
σl 1.42 0.70 2.12 0.66 σr 0.23 0.02 0.11 0.01
ξp 0.53 0.06 0.74 0.05 σp 0.22 0.03 0.10 0.01
ιw 0.59 0.12 0.48 0.17 σw 0.21 0.03 0.27 0.03
ιp 0.46 0.20 0.26 0.13 ρa 0.91 0.05 0.93 0.02
ψ 0.31 0.14 0.69 0.11 ρb 0.33 0.15 0.21 0.11
φ 1.40 0.09 1.60 0.09 ρg 0.92 0.04 0.97 0.01
rπ 1.51 0.22 1.96 0.20 ρi 0.69 0.11 0.72 0.06
ιr 0.86 0.04 0.84 0.02 ρr 0.36 0.11 0.31 0.08
ry 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.03 ρp 0.69 0.23 0.83 0.08
r∆y 0.23 0.03 0.14 0.02 ρw 0.95 0.02 0.87 0.06
π̄ 0.80 0.11 0.71 0.07 µp 0.55 0.21 0.68 0.13
β−1 − 1 0.24 0.09 0.13 0.05 µw 0.92 0.03 0.72 0.10
l̄ 2.82 1.69 8.51 1.05 ρga 0.60 0.11 0.41 0.10
γ̄ 0.39 0.04 0.44 0.02 σm 0.42 0.04 0.59 0.04
α 0.20 0.03 0.21 0.02 c 0.29 0.08 0.31 0.08
κ 0.06 - 0.01 -
Table 1.6: Correlation Coefficients
Measurement Error Kim-Wright VAR Cochrane-Piazzesi λ1
Kim-Wright 0.84 [0.92] 1.00
VAR 0.83 [0.98] 0.91 1.00
Cochrane-Piazzesi 0.74 [0.84] 0.97 0.86 1.00
λ1 0.83 [0.93] 0.99 0.95 0.97 1.00
Notes: a. Values in square parantheses reported in the first column correspond to correlation coefficients
computed over the smaller sample of 1982Q1 - 2006Q4.
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Table 1.7: Regression Analysis (III)
Equation (1.1) Equation (1.8)
Test: χ2
Sample Period k α0 α1 R̄
2 γ0 γ1 γ2 H0 : γ1 = γ2 R̄
2
1966:1 - 1979:2
2 1.69∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 0.32 3.69∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 0.68∗ 23.6∗∗∗ 0.52
(2.41) (4.10) (12.1) (6.03) (1.87)
4 2.00∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 0.41 3.66∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗ 16.9∗∗∗ 0.65
(2.86) (3.90) (14.0) (7.24) (2.39)
6 2.40∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.33 3.62∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 6.91∗∗∗ 0.53
(3.66) (3.74) (11.9) (5.59) (2.18)
8 2.76∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.23 3.63∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.48∗ 4.93∗∗ 0.33
(5.18) (3.56) (10.3) (4.15) (1.80)
1984:1 - 2006:4
2 2.57∗∗∗ 0.35 0.04 3.03∗∗∗ 0.33 0.40∗ 0.50 0.04
(4.27) (1.53) (8.02) (1.39) (1.70)
4 2.63∗∗∗ 0.35 0.05 3.08∗∗∗ 0.32 0.41 0.72 0.06
(4.00) (1.41) (7.69) (1.24) (1.58)
6 2.50∗∗∗ 0.43∗ 0.10 3.03∗∗∗ 0.38 0.49∗ 1.22 0.13
(3.97) (1.76) (7.81) (1.53) (1.89)
8 2.60∗∗∗ 0.38∗ 0.10 3.05∗∗∗ 0.34 0.44∗ 1.50 0.14
(4.56) (1.78) (8.71) (1.56) (1.93)
Notes: a. In parantheses presented below the coefficient estimates we report the corresponding t-statistics. The stan-
dard errors used to compute the t-statistics have been adjusted via the methodology proposed by Newey and West
(1987) to correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
b. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively using a two-tailed test.
c. Figures for the Wald test in column 9 denote χ2 test statistics.*, **, and *** denote rejection of the null hypothe-




































Table 1.8: Regression Analysis (IV)
Benchmark CF (I)
Sample Period k α0 α1 R̄
2 α0,1 α1,1
1966:1 - 1979:2
2 3.64∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.50 2.58∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 0.49
(10.5) (8.89) (7.56) (11.4)
4 3.56∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.58 2.74∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.49
(11.1) (7.32) (6.10) (5.26)
6 3.49∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.48 2.95∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.34
(9.80) (4.10) (5.87) (3.15)
8 3.51∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.29 3.22∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.15
(9.34) (3.83) (7.39) (2.69)
Notes: a. In parantheses presented below the coefficient estimates we report the
corresponding t-statistics. The standard errors used to compute the t-statistics
have been adjusted via the methodology proposed by Newey and West (1987) to
correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
b. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively using a two-tailed test.
c. Experiments: CF (I): we change only the values of the monetary reaction co-
efficients to the estimates obtained in the second sub-sample.
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Table 1.9: Regression Analysis (V)
Benchmark CF (II)
Sample Period k α0 α1 R̄
2 α0,1 α1,1
1966:1 - 1979:2
2 3.64∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.50 3.11∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.46
(10.5) (8.89) (8.52) (8.59)
4 3.56∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.58 3.12∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.52
(11.1) (7.32) (8.27) (6.51)
6 3.49∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.48 3.18∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.40
(9.80) (4.10) (7.44) (3.70)
8 3.51∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.29 3.32∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.21
(9.34) (3.83) (8.05) (3.26)
Notes: a. In parantheses presented below the coefficient estimates we report the
corresponding t-statistics. The standard errors used to compute the t-statistics
have been adjusted via the methodology proposed by Newey and West (1987) to
correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
b. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively using a two-tailed test.
c. Experiments: CF (II) - we change only the values of the NKPC slope to the
estimates obtained in the second sub-sample.
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Table 1.10: Regression Analysis (VI)
Benchmark CF (III)
Sample: 1966:1 - 1979:2 Sample: 1982:1 - 2006:4
k α0 α1 R̄
2 k α0 α1 R̄
2
2 3.64∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.50 2 3.29∗∗∗ −0.03 0.00
(10.5) (8.89) (8.76) (-0.23)
4 3.56∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.58 4 3.41∗∗∗ −0.10 0.02
(11.1) (7.32) (10.1) (-0.70)
6 3.49∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.48 6 3.43∗∗∗ −0.12 0.05
(9.80) (4.10) (11.8) (-1.06)
8 3.51∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.29 8 3.41∗∗∗ −0.10 0.04
(9.34) (3.83) (13.6) (-1.06)
Notes: a. In parantheses presented below the coefficient estimates
we report the corresponding t-statistics. The standard errors used
to compute the t-statistics have been adjusted via the methodol-
ogy proposed by Newey and West (1987) to correct for autocorre-
lation and heteroskedasticity.
b. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level respectively using a two-tailed test.
c. Experiments: CF (III) - we simulate our benchmark model on
the second sub-sample smoothed shock estimates.
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Table 1.11: Structural Correlation Decomposition
1964:1 - 1979:2
Model ηa ηb ηg ηi ηr ηp ηw
Term Spread
k = 2 0.75 0.09 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.22 0.04 0.08
k = 4 0.70 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.04 0.08
k = 6 0.61 0.01 0.18 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.07
k = 8 0.51 -0.03 0.17 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.06
1982:1 - 2006:6
Model ηa ηb ηg ηi ηr ηp ηw
Term Spread
k = 2 0.49 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.08
k = 4 0.50 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.08
k = 6 0.48 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.24 0.00 0.04 0.06
k = 8 0.44 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.29 -0.02 0.02 0.04
Notes: a. The second column of the table reports the unconditional correlation between the term
spread and various growth rates of future GDP implied by our model. The columns thereafter report
the contributions of each shock to the unconditional correlation, where ηa: TFP, ηb: risk premium, ηg:
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Identification strength with asymptotic Information matrix (log-scale)
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relative to prior std
Notes: Using the routines developed by Ratto and Iskrev (2011) for DYNARE, the above figure plots the
identification strength of parameters in increasing order from left to right. As discussed by Pfeifer (2014),
parameters that are not identified imply that the likelihood function is flat in their corresponding direction.
This would be reflected by an identification strength of 0 (blue bars) in the graph above.
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Figure 1.2: Term Premia Estimates
Year


















Notes: The figure plots the measurement error, our proxy for term premia, alongside other estimates of the
10 year term premium found in the literature. KW: Kim and Wright (2005) measure, VAR: measure based
on a Vector Autoregression as in Evans and Marshall (2001), CP: Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) measure.
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Figure 1.3: Impulse Response Functions: ηrt ↑













































Notes: Presented are the impulse response functions to a positive monetary policy shock. The impulse
responses are computed using the mode of the posterior distribution computed over the 1966:1 - 1979:2
sub-sample. The y-axis denotes percentage deviations from steady state and the x-axis denotes the quarters
elapsed following the shock.
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Figure 1.4: Impulse Response Functions: ηbt ↑













































Notes: Impulse response functions to a positive risk premium shock. The impulse responses are computed
using the mode of the posterior distribution computed over the 1966:1 - 1979:2 sub-sample. The y-axis




Figure 1.5: Impulse Response Functions: ηit ↑













































Notes: Impulse response functions to a positive investment shock. The impulse responses are computed
using the mode of the posterior distribution computed over the 1984:1 - 2006:4 sub-sample. The y-axis






Definition of observable variables used in the estimation:
• Output = ln (GDPC1/LNSindex) ∗ 100
• Consumption = ln ((PCEC/GDPDEF) /LNSindex) ∗ 100
• Investment = ln ((FPI/GDPDEF) /LNSindex) ∗ 100
• Hours = ln((PRS85006023 ∗ CE16OV/100)/LNSindex) ∗ 100
• Real Wage = ln(PRS85006103/GDPDEF) ∗ 100
• Inflation = ln(GDPDEF/GDPDEF(−1)) ∗ 100
• Interest Rate = FEDFUNDS / 4
• Term Spread = (DGS10 - TB3MS) / 4
Source of original data:
• GDPC1: Real Gross Domestic Product - Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Seasonally
Adjusted Annual Rate.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
• LNS11000000: Civilian Labor Force Status : Civilian no-institutional population -
Age: 16 years and over -Seasonally Adjusted - Number in thousands.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
• LNSindex: LNS10000000(1992:3) = 1.
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• PCEC: Personal Consumption Expenditures - Billions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted
Annual Rate.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
• GDPDEF: Gross Domestic Product - Implicit Price Deflator - 2009=100, Seasonally
Adjusted.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
• FPI: Fixed Private Investment - Billions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
• PRS85006103: Non-farm Business, All Persons, Hourly Compensation Duration: in-
dex, 2009 =100, Seasonally Adjusted.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
• CE16OV: Civilian Employment: Sixteen Years & Over, Thousands, Seasonally Ad-
justed.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
• CE16OV index: CE16OV (1992:3)=1
• PRS85006103: Non-farm Business, All Persons, Hourly Compensation Duration: in-
dex, 2009 =100, Seasonally Adjusted.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
• FEDFUNDS: Averages of Daily Figures - Percent.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Before 1954: 3-Month
Treasury Bill Rate, Secondary Market Averages of Business Days, Discount Basis)
• DGS10: 10 Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Percent.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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• TB3MS: 3 Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Percent.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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Expectational Shocks and the US
Term Spread
2.1 Introduction
This paper quantifies the extent to which shifts in the expectations of agents in the form
of “news shocks” matter for explaining the variation in the slope of the term structure of
interest rates. Our analysis is conducted within the framework of a medium-scale dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.
The diversity of analyses into the term structure is indicative of the importance it plays, in
particular, to the study of macroeconomics, finance and the interactions that connect these
two disciplines. Empirical macroeconomic research, for example, has documented that de-
velopments in the US term spread1 typically lead developments in real GDP growth (Laurent
et al., 1989; Chen, 1991; Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991). As discussed by Rudebusch et al.
(2006), the theoretical basis for the term spread’s predictive capacity can be motivated by
regarding the long rate as a proxy for the neutral rate of interest i.e. that level of interest
rate consistent with a closed output gap. Therefore, it follows that a change in the policy
1Defined as the difference between a long and short nominal Government spot rate.
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rate relative to the neutral rate should be indicative of the position of monetary policy so
that a steep term structure, for example, should imply accommodative policy and lead to
subsequent economic growth. Graphically, the leading properties of the term spread can
be observed in Figure 2.1. After lagging real output growth by 4 quarters, the two series
appear to be positively correlated2 thus supporting the idea that the term structure exhibits
predictive properties. Despite long-standing recognition of the term spread as a leading
pro-cyclical variable, the nature of the underlying innovations responsible for term-spread
fluctuations has, until recently, eluded the literature. Filling this void, a recent paper by Kur-
mann and Otrok (2013a) has identified news about future total factor productivity (TFP)
as a fundamental driver of term spread fluctuations. In response to a positive TFP news
shock, the authours document contemporaneous falls in both inflation and the federal funds
rate. Crucially, the loosening in the policy rate attenuates up the term structure, implying
an increase in the term spread on impact. The response of output, however, exhibits no
immediate response but then gradually begins to expand and track the anticipated increase
in TFP thus confirming the term-spread as a leading pro-cyclical variable.
The findings of Kurmann and Otrok (2013a) compliment the growing interest in anticipated
shocks that has been re-initiated due to the influential work of Beaudry and Portier (2006).
In their paper, the authours use a bivariate structural VAR containing stock prices and TFP
to identify their anticipated TFP shock. Their identification scheme is based on the premise
that developments in the growth rate of future TFP are, to a great extent, anticipated and
therefore priced into variables such as asset prices which are inherently forward looking.
Furthermore, by expanding their system to include a variety of macro aggregates, the au-
thours find that their anticipated shock explains a considerable fraction of the variation in
consumption, hours and investment at business cycle frequencies thus providing empirical
support for the earlier conjectures of Pigou (1929)3.
2To the tune of 0.41.
3The interested reader is directed to Beaudry and Portier (2014) who provide a comprehensive survey of
VAR-based empirical work on news shocks.
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Following the work of Beaudry and Portier (2006) many authours have investigated the im-
portance of news shocks within the framework of a dynamic general equilibrium model. One
particular strand of research has examined the necessary frictions required to manufacture
an expectation-led boom within a DSGE model4 (Beaudry and Portier, 2004; Jaimovich and
Rebelo, 2009; Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner, 2009; Kobayashi et al., 2010). Research has
also been active in the use of estimated DSGE models to conduct structural decompositions
of the source of fluctuations that are attributable to anticipated shocks. An important ex-
ample is that of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) who estimate a real business cycle model
containing both anticipated and unanticipated components in the exogenous sources of un-
certainty. The authours find that the anticipated sources of uncertainty account for half
of the variation in output, consumption, investment and hours. Related, is the analysis
of Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) who examine the importance of anticipated shocks within a
medium-scale New Keynesian model. In contrast to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012), the
authours find that it is the unanticipated shocks that account for the bulk of variation in
consumption, investment, wages and the interest rate5. The variance of hours and inflation,
however, are predominantly explained by the anticipated component of the wage mark-up
shock suggesting that news unrelated to technological developments may play an important
role in business cycle fluctuations. By comparison, less is known about the relative impor-
tance of news shocks in explaining the variation of asset prices within the context of a DSGE
model. This is despite asset prices being a natural candidate to reflect expectational shocks
since they are both forward looking and sufficiently flexible to accommodate the arrival of
relevant news. A notable exception is the analysis of Guo (2011) who finds that expecta-
tional shocks pertaining to the future state of TFP to be significant a driver of the external
4This literature follows from the work of Barro and King (1984) who show that a standard one-sector
real business cycle model is unable to generate an expectation led boom (positive co-movement in output,
consumption, investment and hours) in receipt of favourable news regarding future productivity. See Krusell
and McKay (2010) for a survey.
5The authours attribute the difference in results to the inclusion of nominal rigidities. Their reasoning is
that endogenous price and wage mark-ups change the transmission mechanisms of their model in favour of
the unanticipated shocks, particularly the shock to the marginal efficiency of investment.
58
Chapter 2
finance premium. However, it remains to be seen whether their results remain robust in a
more quantitatively relevant model featuring more rigidities and structural shocks.
Motivated by the findings of Kurmann and Otrok (2013a), we first quantitatively examine
the role of a TFP news shock in explaining term spread fluctuations. To this end, we estimate
a variant of the Smets and Wouters (2007) model and perform a structural decomposition
of the term spread using US macro and interest rate data. Variance decompositions reveal
that the monetary policy shock explains over 40% of term spread variation over our sample.
Our model predicts that an exogenous tightening (loosening) of the policy rate engenders a
flattening (steepening) of the yield curve which is then proceeded by an economic contraction
(expansion). Therefore, conditional on a monetary policy shock, the term spread reflects the
data in that is a leading and pro-cyclical variable, we offer this as a structural interpretation
of why the model attributes a large share of term spread variation to the monetary policy
shock. A key finding of our analysis is that our model attributes a negligible role to the TFP
news shock in explaining term spread fluctuations, accounting for only 0.15% of its variance.
Moreover, our results are consistent with those of Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2012) in that they are indicative of the unimportance of stationary TFP
news shocks in general, accounting for less than 5% of the variation in key macro aggregates.
We then extend our analysis by considering other forms of news by accommodating an an-
ticipated component in each exogenous process. However, our results find only a limited
role for other forms of news, we find that it is the unanticipated disturbances which account
for the majority of fluctuations in our model. In particular, unanticipated shocks jointly
account for over 86% of the term spread’s variance.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides details on the model
economy and outlines the optimisation problems faced by its agents. Section 2.3 provides
details on the estimation procedure. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 contain and discusses the main
results of the paper. Section 2.6 concludes and offers potential avenues for future research.
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2.2 The Model Economy
The benchmark model used in our paper is a close variant of the Smets and Wouters (2007)
model. Minor differences include the use of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator as opposed to the
aggregator proposed by Kimball (1995). Furthermore, we also exclude fixed costs in the
production process. Our novelty stems from the use of the term spread in the measurement
equation and the inclusion of anticipated components in the processes of the structural
shocks.
The economy is defined by five types of agent: households, a labour packer, intermediate-
good producing firms, final-good producing firms and a Government6.
2.2.1 Households
A representative household, indexed over i ∈ [0, 1], is assumed to maximise a utility function





















where β denotes the household’s discount factor, ιc controls the strength of the external
consumption habit, σc is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and σh
denotes the elasticity of labour supply. The maximisation of (2.1) is subject to the household
budget constraint which is presented below.































6Details on the model’s equilibrium conditions can be found in the accompanying appendix.
60
Chapter 2
Whereby households invest in a portfolio of nominal Government bonds where PNj,t denotes
today’s price of a j-period bond and BNj,t(i) denotes the quantity held. We assume that
the one-period nominal bond, BN1,t, pays a risk-free gross return of Rt,t+1. Following Smets
and Wouters (2007) we introduce a risk-premium shock denoted by ζbt that drives a wedge
between the interest rate set by the monetary authority and the return on the one-period
bond. Furthermore, bonds of maturity j > 1 in our model have no implications for resource
allocation and are assumed to be held in zero net supply. Investment is given by It(i),
Wt(i) is the real wage, R
K
t−1,t is the rental rate on effective capital, Kt(i). Dt and Tt are
representative of transfers from the intermediate firm and Government respectively. Before
households are able to earn income from renting effective capital to firms, they must first
transform it from physical capital via:
Kt(i) = Ut(i)K̄t−1(i) (2.3)
where Ut(i) denotes the intensity to which physical capital is transformed into effective
capital. The cost, in terms of resources, of altering the intensity of capital use is given by
the cost function F (Ut(i))
7. The capital stock is assumed to evolve according to:










where δ is the fixed rate of depreciation and Φ represents a convex investment adjustment
cost function that follows the formulation presented in Christiano et al. (2005)8. The shock
ζ it can be interpreted as a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment.
7F = 0, F ′ and F ′′ > 0




To introduce nominal rigidities into the wage setting process we follow the formulation
presented in Erceg et al. (2000) and assume that individual labour supply,Ht(i), is aggregated
by a labour packer to form an index of labour input to be used in the production of the










where ζwt denotes the elasticity of substitution between labour services. To permit a role for
shocks to the mark-up of wages over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure we assume an ARMA(1,1) process9 for ζwt :
ln ζwt = (1− ρw) ln ζ







Furthermore, aggregate labour demand is represented by Ht. Maximisation of the labour










Staggered wage setting is introduced following the formulation presented in Calvo (1983) so
that each period each household faces a constant probability, θw ∈ [0, 1], of being unable to
re-optimise their wage rate, Wt(i). For those households unable to re-optimise we assume








9As discussed by Smets and Wouters (2007), the motivation for including an MA term is that it allows
the model to better capture the high frequency component in wage fluctuations.
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where gross inflation is given by Πt−1,t =
Pt
Pt−1
, γ denotes the steady state level of trend
growth in the economy and ιw ∈ [0, 1] controls the strength of indexation. Furthermore,
Π denotes the steady state inflation rate. The remaining fraction of households able to re-
optimise their wage, Wt(i), do so by solving the following optimisation problem subject to
















































where Λt,t+k(i) and λt+k(i) is representative of the household stochastic discount factor and





















For production, our economy features two types of firms: final-good producing firms and
intermediate-good producing firms. The output of the final-good firm, Yt, is packaged from
a bundle of differentiated goods, Yt(j), produced by a continuum of intermediate-good pro-











where ζpt denotes the elasticity of substitution among intermediate-firm output. We intro-
duce price mark-up shocks into our analysis by assuming that ζpt follows an ARMA(1,1)
process10 that is identical to the form assumed for ζwt . Final-good firms, operating in per-
fectly competitive markets, seek to maximise profits subject to the technology constraint in
10As discussed by Smets and Wouters (2007), the motivation for including an MA term is that it allows
the model to better capture the high frequency component in inflation fluctuations.
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where α is a share parameter, ζat denotes the stock of TFP and γ
t is defined as the exogenous
labour-augmenting technological progress11.
Furthermore, we assume that intermediate firms sell their output in a monopolistically com-
petitive market subject to a Calvo (1983) constraint. For the fraction θp of intermediate










Those intermediate firms able to re-optimise will pick a price consistent with maximising the



































Since the intermediate-good firm is ultimately owned by the household future profits are
therefore discounted by the household stochastic discount factor.
2.2.5 Government
























where Gt is indicative of exogenous government spending shocks which, as in Smets and
Wouters (2007), respond to developments in domestic TFP. Exogenous spending is funded
through the issuance of nominal bonds and the setting of a lump-sum tax.
Monetary policy is set through a Taylor-type rule in which the central bank reacts positively
























Potential output, Y ft , in our model is defined as that level of output that would pertain
in the absence of mark-up shocks and flexible wages and prices. We also permit a role for




Combining the Government’s budget constraint with that of the households and making use
of the zero-profit condition for both the labour packer and the final-good firm yields the
aggregate resource constraint:




The assumption of labour-augmenting technological progress implies that, along the balanced
growth path, Yt, Ct, It, Kt−1 and Wt are all trending at an equivalent rate. We therefore
render trending variables stationary via the following transformation: X̄t = Xt/γ
t. The
model’s solution is then approximated by log-linearising the equilibrium equations around
the non-stochastic steady state.
2.2.8 News Shocks
To introduce news shocks into our analysis consider, for example, the law of motion assumed
for the TFP shock:







In addition to the standard unanticipated TFP shock, η0t,a, (2.19) permits a role for an
anticipated shock, ηjt,a, that, if expected today, materialises in j periods time. The standard
deviation of the innovation ηjt,a is mean zero and is uncorrelated with the unanticipated












= 0 for m > 0. Details
on how j is set are deferred to section 2.3. In terms of the information structure assumed
here we opt for simplicity and follow the formulation presented in Christiano et al. (2007)
and subsequently Guo (2011). Specifically, we assume that news is anticipated perfectly in
that there is no noise surrounding the signal that agent’s receive. Furthermore, we assume
that there is no TFP diffusion, TFP is set to increase only at the date of the news shock
being realised12. Finally, we assume that the news shock is not subject to revisions as agent’s
gather more information about the signal. Of course we could allow for a richer information
structure13 but we feel that the one currently assumed does not detract away from our main
point of enquiry which is to investigate the extent to which developments in the term spread
12See Comin et al. (2009) for a model in which technology diffusion is more rigorously considered.
13For example, the information structure presented in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) allow for the
possibility that agents are able to update the original signal as more information is gathered.
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lead economic growth conditional on favourable news concerning the future state of output.
2.2.9 Asset Pricing
In pricing the nominal term structure, we exploit the recursive nature of the fundamental
asset pricing equation central to the C-CAPM framework. Assuming no-arbitrage, the Euler








In keeping with tantamount studies, we assume that, upon maturity, each bond will pay
out one unit of currency. Exploiting the recursive nature of (2.20), we can price the entire


















































































where, for example, YNj,t denotes the continuously compounded yield on the j-period bond.
We then define the term spread, TSt, as the difference between the 40 and 1 quarter nominal







Prior to the estimation of our model, we calibrate a subset of parameters that are notoriously
difficult to identify. In particular, we set ζp and ζw both at 10 to hit a price and wage mark-up
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of both 10% in the steady state. The rate of depreciation, δ, is calibrated at 0.025, implying
an annual depreciation rate of 10%. The rest of the model’s parameters are estimated on






















































In keeping with Smets and Wouters (2007), we include information on: the log difference of
real consumption, the log difference of real output, the log difference of real wages, the log
difference of real investment, the log of hours worked, the log difference of the GDP deflator
and the federal funds rate. A key addition to our model is that we include the term spread
in the measurement equation so that we can uncover, in a structural sense, those innovations
most important in explaining term spread fluctuations. We construct the term spread by
subtracting the 3-month Treasury bill rate from the 10-year Treasury bond rate. The data
set is of quarterly frequency and spans from 1966:1 - 2004:4. The measurement equation in
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where γ̄ = 100 · (γ − 1) denotes the trend growth rate of the economy, H̄ is the steady
state of hours worked, Π̄ = 100 · (Π− 1) represents the steady state rate of inflation and
R̄ = 100 · (γσcβ−1Π− 1) represents the steady state nominal interest rate and c̄ denotes the
level of the term spread in steady state. Following De Graeve et al. (2009), we attach a
measurement error onto the measurement equation associated with the term spread. This
is motivated on the basis that bond yields reflect both expectations regarding the stance of
future monetary policy and risk premia.15
The Bayesian methodology employed in this paper combines the prior density of our pa-






One benefit of our estimation strategy is that it is a natural framework to test competing
models which, for our purposes, will be utilised to pin down the optimal anticipation horizon
for the anticipated TFP shock. By integrating both sides of (2.24) we can compare the
marginal likelihood for each model that is differentiated by the anticipation horizon of the
14For notation, we let X̃t denotes the log-linearised counterpart of Xt.
15This point is discussed more thoroughly in the proceeding section. Furthermore, see Kim and Orphanides
(2007) for an overview on term premia for US long-term yields.
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news shock. Specifically, from (2.19), we estimate a battery of models for j ∈ [0, 12] and
compare the respective marginal likelihood for each model:
p(Y|M i) =
∫
p(Θi|M i)L(Θi|Y|,M i)dΘi (2.25)
Consistent with maximising the value of (2.25), we set our anticipation horizon to 8 quarters.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Parameter Estimates and Model Fit
Table 2.1 reports the mode of the posterior distribution for our benchmark model. For com-
parison, we also present estimates of a variant of our model which excludes the anticipated
component of the TFP shock. However, as can be seen from Table 1, there is little difference
in the estimates reported for the two models. To a great extent, this may be symptomatic
of the relatively small estimate of the standard deviation reported for the anticipated TFP
shock when compared against the other shock standard deviation estimates. Moreover, our
estimate of 0.03 is one order of magnitude smaller than those estimates typically found in
comparable studies (Fujiwara et al., 2011; Khan and Tsoukalas, 2012; Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe, 2012) which, at first glance, is suggestive of the relative unimportance our model
attributes to the anticipated TFP shock. We do, however, find that our estimates obtained
for the structural parameters in addition to those governing the other shock processes are
well within the range reported in other studies considering medium scale New-Keynesian
models (Smets and Wouters, 2007; Justiniano et al., 2010).
One way in which we can evaluate the fit of our model is to assess the standard deviation
of the measurement error appended to the term spread observation equation. Inspection of
Figure 2.2 is indicative of large deviations between the term spread implied by our model
and that of the data. As such, the measurement error appears to be significant in our anal-
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ysis, particularly during the 1980s. However, it is important to recognise that movements
in the term spread may be the result of changes in the expected path of future short-term
interest rates or changes to the quantity of term premia demanded by those investors holding

















where the first term on the RHS of (2.26) is consistent with the expectations hypothesis16
(EH). The second term is representative of term premia. The estimation procedure em-
ployed in this analysis offers a natural way of decomposing the term spread into these two
components. As discussed by Morell (2017), the estimation of linearised DSGE models will,
by construction, impose the pure EH17, such that the smoothed estimate of the term spread
implied by our model will be driven solely by changes in the expected path of the short-term
interest rate. Those term spread fluctuations that the model is unable to account for will
be reflected through the measurement error which, given the discussion above, should serve
as a proxy for term premia. Indeed, we find the correlation between the measurement error
and the commonly quoted Kim and Wright (2005) estimate of the 10 year term premium
to be 0.9118. Consequently, the significance of the measurement error is most likely to be
reflective of developments in term premia as opposed to being indicative of poor model fit
more generally. For instance, the peak in the measurement error during the late 1970s and
early 1980s coincides with that period characterised by stable US real rates in addition to
high and unstable rates of inflation. In such an environment, investors will prefer to invest
in short-term bonds and will require positive term premia as compensation for investing in
16The EH implies that the expected excess return on long-term bonds over short-term bonds is constant
over time and dependent upon maturity. In its purest form, the pure expectations hypothesis, says that
these expected excess returns are zero (Lutz, 1940).
17See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) for an overview on how linearised solution methods imply the
certainty equivalence theorem and thereby restrict risk premia to be zero.
18We report correlations of a similar magnitude with other estimates of the 10 year term premium. Full
results are available on request.
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relatively riskier long-term bonds (Cochrane, 2007)19. Furthermore, the secular decline in
the measurement error since the late 1980s is also consistent with the pattern observed for
US term premia (Wright, 2011).
2.4.2 Transmission of the Anticipated TFP Shock
Figure 2.3 presents the impulses response functions associated with the anticipated TFP
shock. Consistent with Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) and Kurmann and Otrok (2013a),
our model exibits positive impact co-movement among consumption, investment, hours and
output. This result, however, stands in stark contrast to the predictions of the standard neo-
classical economy considered in Barro and King (1984) which, for a long time, has constrained
the importance of news shocks from a theoretical perspective. To see their result, consider





whereby the rate at which agents are willing to trade leisure for consumption goods is equal
to the marginal product of labour. The reception of good news about the future, through the
wealth effect, will induce agents to increase today’s consumption causing the LHS of (2.27)
to increase20. Thus, in a frictionless neoclassical setting, hours must fall as to maintain the
intra-temporal efficiency condition. An increase in consumption coupled with a decline in
hours will, through the budget constraint, trigger a fall in investment and output.
Of course, this result is conditional on the marginal product of labour schedule remaining
constant, for if the anticipated shock can generate an increase in the marginal product of
labour, then the previous constraint need no longer bind - consumption, investment, hours
and output may all increase on impact. In bringing about the necessary shift in the marginal
19This is because, relative to long-term bonds, short-term rates offer a better hedge against unstable
inflation rates since they adapt much more quickly to developments in the inflation rate.
20MRSC(C,H) > 0 and MRSC(C,H) > 0
72
Chapter 2
product of labour schedule, we find the inclusion of variable capacity utilisation and invest-
ment adjustment costs to be pivotal. However, since the use of capacity utilisation incurs a
cost to firms, there must be a significant decrease in the value of installed capital, Tobin’s
Q, in order to incentivise firms to work their capital stock more intensely. As in Jaimovich
and Rebelo (2009), investment adjustment costs are key here in effecting a sufficient fall in
Tobin’s Q, which in turn raises the marginal product of labour via the increase in capac-
ity utilisation. Figure 2.4 illustrates the importance of adjustment costs in generating an
expectation-led boom by comparing the impulse response functions of our benchmark model
against those in which the costs of investment adjustment have been reduced significantly.
The figure makes clear that in the absence of significant adjustment costs, output, hours
and investment all decrease on impact despite the reception of favourable news concerning
the future state of TFP. The intuition behind this result is that adjustment costs imply that
it is no longer optimal to begin investing in 8 quarters time when the news shock realises.
Rather, agents should effect their investment plans today and enter that period with higher
levels of investment as to minimise the costs of adjustment. Investment smoothing augments
the current capital stock, but since additional capital will only be justified when the news
shock materialises, the value of installed capital begins to fall thus leading to the observed
decrease in Tobin’s Q. Firms will therefore work their capital stock more intensely in order
to placate the additional demand brought about by the investment adjustment costs.
On the nominal side of the economy and contrast to the findings of Kurmann and Otrok
(2013a), we observe an increase in inflation which, when coupled with the positive comove-
ment of real aggregates, effects a rise in the policy rate causing the slope to decrease on
impact. Such a response clearly conflicts with the notion that the term structure should, as
a leading indicator, anticipate the incipient economic growth that a news shock engenders.
Culpable, to a great extent, is the aforementioned positive response of inflation. The ini-
tial increase in inflation is largely due to the upward pressure investment adjustment costs
enforce on aggregate demand. Moreover, since we assume no diffusion in TFP, TFP is not
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expected to change until the date in which the news shock materialises. As such, there will
be no reduction in marginal costs to counteract the upward pressure on inflation until that
date. The subsequent and sharp decline in the inflation rate is a consequence of the antici-
pated TFP shock realising. It is interesting to note that while investment adjustment costs
are central to the positive co-movement result, they also accentuate the qualitative disparity
of the term spread response relative to Kurmann and Otrok (2013a). In this regard, our
findings echo those of Kurmann and Otrok (2013b)21.
2.4.3 Variance Decompositions
To examine the quantitative importance of the anticipated TFP shock, we calculate the un-
conditional forecast error variance decomposition of our benchmark model evaluated at the
posterior mean of our parameter estimates. Table 2.4 contains our results for the term spread
alongside other selected variables. A key observation is the importance our model attributes
to the monetary policy shock in explaining term spread variation, accounting for 43.6% of its
variance22. Furthermore, our model also attaches importance to the wage and price mark-up
shocks explaining 17.2% and 18.2 % of term spread variation respectively. Analysing the
dynamic relationship between the term spread and output that these shocks imply yields
great insight into our results. For example, from Figure 2.5, following a monetary policy
shock, we observe that the initial increase in the policy rate attenuates up the term structure
as evidenced by the reaction of long-term bond yields falling relatively less in comparison.
Consequently, the term spread decreases significantly on impact. Due to higher interest
rates, investment and consumption are cut back causing output growth to be negative in the
proceeding periods. Furthermore, following both mark-up shocks, we observe a term spread
that positively leads output growth. This is because the Central bank is forced to curtail
21The authours stipulate the conditions in which the New-Keynesian paradigm is able to manufacture
a fall in inflation in response to a news shock. First, they propose that the initial pressure on aggregate
demand must be modest. Second, the slope of the NKPC should not be excessive so that fluctuations in
aggregate demand do not fully transmit through to inflation.
22Indeed, De Graeve et al. (2009) also find that the monetary policy shock accounts for a considerable
share of the US term spread’s variance.
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the inflationary pressure implied by each mark-up shock by raising the policy rate and thus
prompting an initial decline in the term spread. Similar to the monetary policy shock, the
subsequent periods of negative output growth are consistent with the strong leading prop-
erties of the term spread in the data and explain why our model attributes a large share of
the term spread’s variance to each of these shocks. In stark contrast, the anticipated TFP
shock is found to be of negligible importance in driving term spread fluctuations, accounting
for only 0.15 % of the term spread’s variance. By a similar argument, we can shed light on
this result by examining Figure 2.3 once more to observe a term spread that is inconsistent
with the data in that it does not positively lead output growth.
Moreover, our results are indicative of the limited contribution that the anticipated TFP
shock plays in explaining the variance of the real side of the economy, accounting for only
0.07%, 0.09%, 0.26% and 0.07% of the variation in output, consumption, hours and invest-
ment respectively. We thus reach similar conclusions to those of Fujiwara et al. (2011), Khan
and Tsoukalas (2012) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) who also find limited support
for the anticipated component in a stationary TFP shock.
2.5 Other Sources of News
Much of the literature on expectation-led business cycles has focussed on news strictly per-
taining to technological progress. However, the contributions of, among others, Khan and
Tsoukalas (2012) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) highlight the importance that news
unrelated to technology may have in driving economic fluctuations. In this section, we exam-
ine the quantitative importance of other forms news in driving term spread fluctuations. To
this end, we re-estimate our model after augmenting all other exogenous processes with an
anticipated component. As in the case of our benchmark model, we consider an anticipation
horizon of 8 quarters for all anticipated shocks. Table 2.3 reports the parameter estimates for
this model alongside those estimates presented in Table 2.1 for comparative purposes. How-
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ever, as can be observed from Table 2.3 we report little difference in the parameter estimates
between all three models. To assess the importance of alternative sources of news, we report
their relative contribution in explaining the variation of key series in Table 2.4. A key find-
ing is that in spite of considering alternative anticipated shocks, it is still the unanticipated
innovations that account for the bulk of variation in our macro series. Of particular interest
is the term spread, we find that 86.3% of its variance is attributed to unanticipated shocks.
However, we do report a role, albeit limited, for the anticipated price and wage mark-up
shocks in that they account for 3.23% and 6.29% of term spread variation respectively. In-
deed, more generally our results indicate that the anticipated mark-up shocks jointly explain
a non-negligible share of the variance in all series, particularly that of wages, consumption
and hours. In this regard, our findings are similar to those of Khan and Tsoukalas (2012)
who also report the anticipated mark-up shocks to be the most important source of news.
However, in contrast to our results, these authours find that for some aggregates, anticipated
shocks are the dominant source of fluctuations. In particular, Khan and Tsoukalas (2012)
find the news component of the wage mark-up shock to explain the majority of variation in
hours and inflation, accounting for 59.9% and 59.4% of total variance respectively. A key
difference in model design between our paper and Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) is that they
consider the preference structure adopted in Greenwood et al. (1988). Specifically, Khan















Xt = (Ct − hCt−1)
ωX1−ωt−1 (2.29)
where β is the subjective discount factor, εbt is a preference shock, Ct denotes consumption,
h is the internal habit parameter, χ is the weight on labour disutility, Lt denotes labour
services, σl is the elasticity of labour supply, σc is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
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and ω is a preference weight. As discuss by Khan and Tsoukalas (2012), when ω = 0 the
preferences presented in (2.28) resembles those of Greenwood et al. (1988). The implication of
Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences is that the intertemporal consumption-savings decision
has no impact on labour supply. Consequently, any favourable news about the future will
not reduce labour supply under this form of preferences. Moreover, the preferences in (2.28)
also nest the case of King et al. (1988) preferences when ω = 1. Under King et al. (1988)
preferences, the intertemporal consumption-savings decision will impact labour supply. Upon
estimating their model, Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) obtain an estimate of ω in which the
impact of inter-temporal substitution on labour effort is partially offset. As such, Khan and
Tsoukalas (2012) find that their model is able to generate aggregate comovement in response
to many anticipated shocks - a key feature observed empirically. This is found to be key in
propagating the anticipated mark-up shocks in Khan and Tsoukalas (2012)’s analysis.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the quantitative importance of anticipated TFP shocks in driv-
ing US term spread fluctuations. Our analysis was conducted using a medium-scale DSGE
model estimated on US data. Our main conclusion is that the anticipated component in the
TFP shock is found to be negligible in explaining variations of key macro aggregates. In
particular, we report that the TFP news shock accounts for less than 1% of the term spread’s
variance. To a great extent, this result is symptomatic of the inability of our model to mimic
the term structure response to an anticipated TFP shock found in the data (Kurmann Otrok,
2012). A key finding of our paper is that in the absence of technology diffusion, positive
comovement in real aggregates drives up marginal costs and thereby inflation causing the
term spread to decline on impact via an endogenous monetary tightening. Future research
could therefore be directed towards augmenting the industry-standard DSGE model with a
rigorous process of technology diffusion. This would provide a micro-founded way of bringing
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the TFP and inflation response closer to the data.
This paper also examined the importance of other forms of news by incorporating an an-
ticipated component on each of the other structural shocks. We found, however, that when
both anticipated and unanticipated shocks compete within the same model, the unantici-




Table 2.1: Prior and Posterior Distributions
Prior Posterior (A) Posterior (B)







Discount factor G 0.25 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.06
100 · (γ∗ − 1) Trend growth N 0.40 0.10 0.43 0.02 0.43 0.02
100 · (Π− 1) Trend inflation G 0.80 0.10 0.81 0.09 0.81 0.09
H∗ SS hours N 0.00 2.00 1.05 1.45 1.02 1.54
C Constant N 0.25 0.10 0.33 0.08 0.32 0.08
σc I.E.I.S N 1.50 0.37 1.28 0.16 1.33 0.16
σh Elast. lab. supply N 2.00 0.75 1.57 0.56 1.47 0.55
ιc Cons. habit B 0.70 0.10 0.79 0.04 0.77 0.04
γw Wage indexation B 0.50 0.15 0.59 0.14 0.60 0.14
θw Calvo wages B 0.50 0.10 0.81 0.03 0.81 0.03
χ Utilisation cost B 0.50 0.15 0.42 0.13 0.44 0.13
Φ
′′
IA cost N 4.00 1.50 5.99 1.05 5.86 1.05
α Capital share N 0.30 0.05 0.18 0.02 0.19 0.02
γp Price indexation B 0.50 0.15 0.20 0.08 0.20 0.08
θp Calvo prices B 0.50 0.10 0.81 0.03 0.80 0.03
φπ TR. Inflation N 1.50 0.25 1.68 0.18 1.70 0.18
φy TR. output N 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03
φ∆y TR. ∆ output N 0.12 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05
γi TR. smoothing N 0.75 0.10 0.73 0.04 0.72 0.04
ρb AR(1) Preference B 0.50 0.20 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.08
ρz AR(1) Inv-specific B 0.50 0.20 0.72 0.07 0.72 0.06
ρa AR(1) TFP B 0.50 0.20 0.96 0.01 0.97 0.01
ρm AR(1) Mon. Pol B 0.50 0.20 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.08
ρg AR(1) Govt. B 0.50 0.20 0.99 0.01 0.98 0.01
ρa,g AR(1) TFP/Govt. B 0.50 0.25 0.55 0.06 0.52 0.06
ρp AR(1) P.M up B 0.50 0.20 0.94 0.04 0.95 0.03
ρw AR(1) W.M up B 0.50 0.20 0.98 0.01 0.98 0.01
Θp MA(1) P.M up B 0.50 0.20 0.71 0.08 0.71 0.08
Θw MA(1) W.M up B 0.50 0.20 0.78 0.08 0.77 0.08
σb Std. Preference IG 0.10 2.00 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02
σz Std. Inv-specific IG 0.10 2.00 0.40 0.05 0.41 0.05
σa Std. TFP IG 0.10 2.00 0.61 0.04 0.63 0.04
σg Std. Govt’ IG 0.10 2.00 0.46 0.03 0.47 0.03
σr Std. Mon. Pol IG 0.10 2.00 0.27 0.02 0.27 0.02
σp Std. P.M up IG 0.10 2.00 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02
σw Std. W.M up IG 0.10 2.00 0.26 0.03 0.26 0.03
σa Std. TFP (news) IG 0.10 2.00 0.03 0.01 - -
σm Std. Measurement U 2.00 2.00 0.66 0.04 0.65 0.04
Notes: a. Model (A) corresponds to our benchmark model which is inclusive of the anticipated
component in the TFP shock process. Model (B) is exclusive of news shocks.
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Output 17.9 9.37 24.8 7.38 11.7 9.00 19.8 0.07
Inflation 3.12 5.18 8.66 6.93 0.88 45.1 33.4 0.15
Consumption 38.1 0.81 6.12 12.5 4.20 9.51 28.7 0.09
Real Wage 5.41 3.38 14.1 5.95 0.59 37.1 33.4 0.15
Investment 1.28 73.5 8.32 1.33 0.89 4.19 10.4 0.07
Hours 21.8 11.4 6.89 8.49 14.8 8.53 27.8 0.26
Policy Rate 5.50 6.64 7.65 43.6 1.11 18.2 17.2 0.15
1 Year Yield 6.18 7.93 8.69 35.7 1.32 19.4 20.6 0.16
5 Year Yield 5.56 6.73 7.73 43.0 1.13 18.3 17.5 0.15
10 Year Yield 5.53 6.68 7.69 43.3 1.12 18.2 17.3 0.15
Term Spread 5.50 6.64 7.65 43.6 1.11 18.2 17.2 0.15
Notes: a. Forecast error variance decompositions at the infinite horizon evaluated at the posterior
mode obtained for Model (A). The entries correspond to the relative contribution of each shock
denoted in percent. Due to rounding, each row may not sum to 100.
b. Where ζb: preference, ζi: investment, ζa: TFP, ζr: monetary policy, ζg: Govt’, ζp: price mark-
up, ζw: wage mark-up.
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Table 2.3: Prior and Posterior Distributions
Prior Posterior (A) Posterior (B) Posterior (C)







Discount factor G 0.25 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.06
100 · (γ∗ − 1) Trend growth N 0.40 0.10 0.43 0.02 0.43 0.02 0.45 0.02
100 · (Π− 1) Trend inflation G 0.80 0.10 0.81 0.09 0.81 0.09 0.75 0.09
H∗ SS hours N 0.00 2.00 1.05 1.45 1.02 1.54 1.37 1.30
C Constant N 0.25 0.10 0.33 0.08 0.32 0.08 0.34 0.08
σc I.E.I.S N 1.50 0.37 1.28 0.16 1.33 0.16 1.40 0.15
σh Elast. lab. supply N 2.00 0.75 1.57 0.56 1.47 0.55 1.97 0.62
ιc Cons. habit B 0.70 0.10 0.79 0.04 0.77 0.04 0.79 0.03
γw Wage indexation B 0.50 0.15 0.59 0.14 0.60 0.14 0.49 0.14
θw Calvo wages B 0.50 0.10 0.81 0.03 0.81 0.03 0.87 0.02
χ Utilisation cost B 0.50 0.15 0.42 0.13 0.44 0.13 0.38 0.12
Φ
′′
IA cost N 4.00 1.50 5.99 1.05 5.86 1.05 5.90 1.02
α Capital share N 0.30 0.05 0.18 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.18 0.02
γp Price indexation B 0.50 0.15 0.20 0.08 0.20 0.08 0.17 0.07
θp Calvo prices B 0.50 0.10 0.81 0.03 0.80 0.03 0.81 0.03
φπ TR. Inflation N 1.50 0.25 1.68 0.18 1.70 0.18 1.72 0.16
φy TR. output N 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.03
φ∆y TR. ∆ output N 0.12 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05
γi TR. smoothing N 0.75 0.10 0.73 0.04 0.72 0.04 0.77 0.03
ρb AR(1) Preference B 0.50 0.20 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.08
ρz AR(1) Inv-specific B 0.50 0.20 0.72 0.07 0.72 0.06 0.66 0.06
ρa AR(1) TFP B 0.50 0.20 0.96 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.97 0.01
ρm AR(1) Mon. Pol B 0.50 0.20 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.23 0.08
ρg AR(1) Govt. B 0.50 0.20 0.99 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.99 0.01
ρa,g AR(1) TFP/Govt. B 0.50 0.25 0.55 0.06 0.52 0.06 0.56 0.06
ρp AR(1) P.M up B 0.50 0.20 0.94 0.04 0.95 0.03 0.94 0.04
ρw AR(1) W.M up B 0.50 0.20 0.98 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.97 0.03
Θp MA(1) P.M up B 0.50 0.20 0.71 0.08 0.71 0.08 0.86 0.07
Θw MA(1) W.M up B 0.50 0.20 0.78 0.08 0.77 0.08 0.94 0.03
σb Std. Preference IG 0.10 2.00 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02
σz Std. Inv-specific IG 0.10 2.00 0.40 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.44 0.05
σa Std. TFP IG 0.10 2.00 0.61 0.04 0.63 0.04 0.61 0.04
σg Std. Govt’ IG 0.10 2.00 0.46 0.03 0.47 0.03 0.45 0.03
σr Std. Mon. Pol IG 0.10 2.00 0.27 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.26 0.02
σp Std. P.M up IG 0.10 2.00 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.17 0.02
σw Std. W.M up IG 0.10 2.00 0.26 0.03 0.26 0.03 0.27 0.02
σ8b Std. Preference (news) IG 0.07 2.00 - - - - 0.03 0.01
σ8z Std. Inv.Spec (news) IG 0.07 2.00 - - - - 0.03 0.01
σ8a Std. TFP (news) IG 0.07 2.00 0.03 0.01 - - 0.03 0.02
σ8g Std. Govt’ (news) IG 0.07 2.00 - - - - 0.03 0.01
σ8r Std. Mon.Pol (news) IG 0.07 2.00 - - - - 0.03 0.01
σ8p Std. P.M.Up (news) IG 0.07 2.00 - - - - 0.03 0.01
σ8w Std. W.M.Up (news) IG 0.07 2.00 - - - - 0.03 0.01
σm Std. Measurement U 2.00 2.00 0.66 0.04 0.65 0.04 0.66 0.04
Notes: Model (C) corresponds to the model with an anticipated component in each of the structural shocks.
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Output 18.6 10.3 30.0 8.56 12.4 2.23 2.67 84.8
Inflation 2.68 4.97 15.3 7.74 0.95 36.9 10.7 79.2
Consumption 42.5 0.20 8.79 15.4 4.97 2.62 4.19 78.7
Real Wage 2.74 2.68 21.2 3.88 0.38 11.2 25.6 67.7
Investment 1.68 70.9 11.4 1.93 1.06 0.98 1.34 89.3
Hours 24.3 13.3 8.74 10.7 16.6 2.24 3.85 79.7
Policy Rate 5.30 6.03 10.5 51.3 1.19 7.39 4.55 86.3
1 Year Yield 6.14 7.38 12.3 43.6 1.45 7.35 5.44 83.7
5 Year Yield 5.37 6.12 10.7 50.7 1.21 7.40 4.62 86.1
10 Year Yield 5.33 6.07 10.6 51.0 1.20 7.40 4.58 86.2















Output 1.61 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.08 3.37 10.3 15.2
Inflation 2.67 0.05 0.04 0.46 0.01 6.30 11.2 20.8
Consumption 2.43 0.09 0.03 0.14 0.03 3.21 15.5 21.3
Real Wage 1.21 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.02 17.7 13.2 32.3
Investment 0.84 0.93 0.02 0.07 0.01 3.33 6.48 32.3
Hours 1.94 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.11 3.15 14.9 10.7
Policy Rate 3.17 0.06 0.04 1.01 0.02 3.23 6.29 13.7
1 Year Yield 3.87 0.07 0.05 0.89 0.03 3.59 7.97 16.3
5 Year Yield 3.21 0.06 0.04 0.99 0.02 3.26 6.40 13.9
10 Year Yield 3.19 0.06 0.04 1.00 0.02 3.24 6.34 13.8
Term Spread 3.16 0.06 0.04 1.01 0.02 3.23 6.29 13.7
Notes: a. Forecast error variance decompositions at the infinite horizon evaluated at the posterior
mode obtained for Model (C). The entries correspond to the relative contribution of each shock de-
noted in percent. Due to rounding, each row may not sum to 100.





Figure 2.1: Term Spread and Real GDP Growth
Date













Notes: The spread is constructed by subtracting the 3-month Treasury bill rate from the 10-year Treasury
bond rate. The output series is defined as the annualised percentage change in real GDP. Both series are
expressed at an annual rate and can be obtained from FRED.
Figure 2.2: Term Spread Fit
Date














Notes: We present the term spread series computed from the data alongside the smoothed estimates implied
by our model. The difference between these two series is reflected by the measurement error.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Response Functions: ζat−8 ↑
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Notes: Impulse response functions to an anticipated TFP shock. The impulse responses are computed using
the mode of the posterior distribution. The y-axis denotes percentage deviations from steady state and the
x-axis denotes the quarters elapsed following the shock.
84
Chapter 2
Figure 2.4: Impulse Response Functions: ζat−8 ↑
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Notes: Impulse response functions to an anticipated TFP shock. The benchmark impulse responses are
computed using the mode of the posterior distribution. Impulses presented for the Low AC model correspond
to a specification in which we change only the investment adjustment cost parameter, Φ′′, from 5.99 to 0.1.
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Notes: Impulse response functions to the monetary, wage mark-up and price mark-up shocks. The impulse
responses are all computed using the mode of the posterior distribution. The y-axis denotes percentage





Definition of observable variables used in the estimation:
• Output = ln (GDPC1/LNSindex) ∗ 100
• Consumption = ln ((PCEC/GDPDEF) /LNSindex) ∗ 100
• Investment = ln ((FPI/GDPDEF) /LNSindex) ∗ 100
• Hours = ln((PRS85006023 ∗ CE16OV/100)/LNSindex) ∗ 100
• Real Wage = ln(PRS85006103/GDPDEF) ∗ 100
• Inflation = ln(GDPDEF/GDPDEF(−1)) ∗ 100
• Interest Rate = FEDFUNDS / 4
• Term Spread = (DGS10 - TB3MS) / 4
Source of original data:
• GDPC1: Real Gross Domestic Product - Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Seasonally
Adjusted Annual Rate.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
• LNS11000000: Civilian Labor Force Status : Civilian no-institutional population -
Age: 16 years and over -Seasonally Adjusted - Number in thousands.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
• LNSindex: LNS10000000(1992:3) = 1.
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• PCEC: Personal Consumption Expenditures - Billions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted
Annual Rate.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
• GDPDEF: Gross Domestic Product - Implicit Price Deflator - 2009=100, Seasonally
Adjusted.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
• FPI: Fixed Private Investment - Billions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
• PRS85006103: Non-farm Business, All Persons, Hourly Compensation Duration: in-
dex, 2009 =100, Seasonally Adjusted.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
• CE16OV: Civilian Employment: Sixteen Years & Over, Thousands, Seasonally Ad-
justed.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
• CE16OV index: CE16OV (1992:3)=1
• PRS85006103: Non-farm Business, All Persons, Hourly Compensation Duration: in-
dex, 2009 =100, Seasonally Adjusted.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
• FEDFUNDS: Averages of Daily Figures - Percent.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Before 1954: 3-Month
Treasury Bill Rate, Secondary Market Averages of Business Days, Discount Basis)
• DGS10: 10 Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Percent.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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• TB3MS: 3 Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Percent.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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2.B Stationary Non-Linear System
Sticky-Price Economy:














where β̄ = βγ−σc
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28. 1 = (1 + ηpt )MC
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p∗ = 1 (SS1)
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In steady state → Φ (·) = Φ′ (·) = 0, from 3.
Q = 1 (SS4)
From (7):
U = 1 (SS5)
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3. Qt = β̄R
KEtR
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7. Yt = η
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19. Qft = β̄R
KEtR
K,f













































t + (1− α)H
f
t





























Asset Pricing in General Equilibrium:
A New-Keynesian Analysis
This chapter consists of work jointly done with Dr Katsuyuki Shibayama. I was responsible
for approximately 60% of the work carried out in this chapter.
3.1 Introduction
This paper examines the ability of the industry-standard New Keynesian Dynamic Stochas-
tic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to jointly explain both macroeconomic and financial
data.
In recent years, the development of DSGE models have undergone considerable progress
(Tovar, 2008). In particular, the most recent crop of New Keynesian DSGE models have
proved particularly useful in providing a coherent framework from which to examine matters
pertaining to monetary policy analysis (Gaĺı and Gertler, 2007; Christiano et al., 2010). Un-
surprisingly, New-Keynesian models have gained considerable popularity in both academic
and Central banking circles alike. Such support for the DSGE paradigm has been bolstered
by advances in computing power and relevant statistical methods now allowing researchers
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to take these models to data1. But, as is typical in the majority of analyses, empirical
validation of DSGE models is usually judged on their ability to explain macroeconomic dy-
namics. A case in point is the celebrated Smets and Wouters (2007) model which has been
shown to explain and forecast selected macroeconomic time series to a similar standard to
that of a Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR). By contrast, the ability of DSGE models
to match key features of asset prices has been relatively less successful in comparison. As
discussed by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), the inadequacy of these models to explain both
macroeconomic and financial data may be an indication of model misspecification. For if
we are confident that the shocks typically identified in DSGE models correspond to the real
risks that economic agents face, then it follows that explaining macroeconomic dynamics
and explaining asset prices are two sides of the same coin. This is because it is through as-
set markets in which consumption and investment are allocated through time and different
states of nature.
Understanding the symbiotic relationship between macroeconomic and financial variables
also has important practical implications. For example, policy makers have been acutely
sensitive to the decline in asset prices and their subsequent impact on the macroecon-
omy following the recent financial crisis. As such, policy makers addressing macro-finance
phenomena will undoubtedly require a coherent framework capable of accurately capturing
macro-finance interactions.
Our paper is related to those analyses investigating the implications for both business cy-
cle and asset price facts within a general equilibrium framework. Specifically, this model
employs the consumption-based capital asset pricing pricing model (C-CAPM) developed
independently by Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979), such that asset prices are determined
by the covariation between their respective payoffs and the marginal consumption utility of
investors.
Among the asset pricing anomalies to emerge from the general equilibrium paradigm, the
1See Herbst and Schorfheide (2015) for an overview on the Bayesian estimation of DSGE models.
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equity premium puzzle highlighted by Mehra and Prescott (1985) has received the most
attention. Danthine et al. (1992) and Rouwenhorst (1995) find that when the pricing kernel
is endogenously determined, it is difficult to achieve sufficient equity premia within a pro-
duction economy. Their reasoning is that the standard neoclassical economy permits agents
to freely divert resources to production thus enabling agents to minimise consumption fluc-
tuations. Increasing the level of risk aversion serves only to strengthen the desire to smooth
consumption, resulting in smaller consumption volatility and thus smaller equity premia.
Jermann (1998) finds that by incorporating both capital adjustment costs and a consump-
tion habit into an otherwise standard neoclassical economy, his model is able to produce a
level of equity premium much closer to that found in the data. Intuitively, the two frictions
generate greater risk premia since, working in tandem, they imply that agents not only care
greatly about consumption volatility, but they are also inhibited in their ability to offset
variable consumption streams via production2.
In addition to the equity premium puzzle, the asset pricing literature has also stressed the
difficulty of replicating certain features of interest rate data. Indeed, several studies have
noted the inability of the earlier generation of DSGE models to replicate both the sign and
quantity of term premia found in the data (Backus et al., 1989; Donaldson et al., 1990;
Den Haan, 1995; Chapman, 1997) - the so called “bond premium puzzle”. For the New Key-
nesian paradigm, this is particularly unsettling, since bond prices largely reflect expectations
of future policy decisions which are in turn influenced by expected inflation and output devi-
ations. Given the use of New Keynesian modelling in guiding the setting of monetary policy,
the ability of these models to generate accurate bond yield moments may serve as a useful
metric to evaluate their empirical performance.
In an important contribution, Swanson and Rudebusch (2012) offer a solution to the bond
premium puzzle by augmenting the prototypical New Keynesian model with Epstein-Zin
preferences and long-run inflation risk. In pricing financial claims, Epstein-Zin preferences
2Boldrin et al. (2001) also reach similar conclusions.
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are particularly attractive in that they allow the level of risk aversion to be calibrated in-
dependently of the investor’s elasticity of intertemporal substitution. This is essential to
ensuring that higher levels of risk aversion affect only risk premiums in their model without
significantly impacting the fit of macroeconomic moments. Also important is the addition
of long-run inflation risk, which is used as a device to raise the variability of inflation which
in turn engenders larger fluctuations in the price of the long-term nominal bond. As such,
higher levels of long-run inflation risk will prompt Epstein-Zin investors to demand greater
levels of risk premia for holding nominal bonds3. While the findings of Swanson and Rude-
busch (2012) are promising, it remains to be seen whether their results extend to the more
empirically realistic DSGE models typically employed by Central banks. Moreover, it is of
interest to examine the extent to which these models are able to explain a wider array of
assets in addition to the nominal term structure. We therefore differentiate our analysis
from Swanson and Rudebusch (2012) by using the industry-standard Smets and Wouters
(2007) model to examine its ability to replicate both standard business cycle statistics in
addition to matching moments on equities and real, nominal and corporate bonds by use of
a non-linear solution method.
Our paper is also similar to De Graeve (2008) in that our analysis uses a medium-scale
DSGE model in order to derive a model-consistent description of the credit spread. Our
novelty, however, stems from use of the external finance premium in the corporate bond
Euler equation, so that entire corporate term structure can be priced in a manner consistent
with the C-CAPM methodology. Moreover, our analysis is differentiated by use of a non-
linear solution method so that the role of uncertainty and its impact on the credit spread
can be studied.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model econ-
omy used in our analysis and sets out the optimisation problems faced by its agents. Section
3In an earlier contribution, Piazzesi et al. (2006) also document how the use of Epstein-Zin preferences
may be used to manufacture a large and positive term premium. However, since their analysis is restricted
to an endowment economy, the contribution of Swanson and Rudebusch (2012) is distinguished by the fact
they are able to solve the bond premium puzzle within a production economy.
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3.3 provides details on the solution method used to solve our model and how it gives rise
to risk premia for financial assets. Section 3.4 presents the main results of the paper by
comparing our model-implied moments against US data. Furthermore, we provide intuition
behind our results by varying the weight on key model features so that we can examine their
marginal effects on risk premia. Section 3.5 contains our concluding comments.
3.2 Model
The benchmark model used in our analysis augments the Smets and Wouters (2007) model
with several key additions found to be successful in matching bond moments. For example,
we follow Swanson and Rudebusch (2012) and permit a role for Epstein and Zin (1989)
and Weil (1990) preferences. Furthermore we include a time-varying inflation target as in
Gürkaynak et al. (2005) to introduce a source of long-run nominal risk into our model.
One other key addition in our analysis is that we also incorporate the financial accelerator
mechanism of Bernanke et al. (1999) by following the formulation presented in Christensen
and Dib (2008). Full details of the model’s equilibrium conditions are left to the Appendix.
3.2.1 Households
A representative household, indexed over i ∈ [0,1], is assumed to maximise an instanta-
neous utility function, Ut, which is non-separable in consumption, Ct and labour supply, Ht.
Formally:













where ζbt is representative of a preference shock. The household receives utility from the
consumption good relative to an external habit, the strength of which is dictated by γc and
receives disutility from the supply of labour services, Ht. The parameters governing the
inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of labour supply are
given by σc and σh respectively. We assume that U (C,H) is increasing in its first argument,
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decreasing in its second, twice differentiable and strictly concave. We incorporate Epstein
and Zin preferences into our analysis by following the formulation specified in Swanson and




















1−̺ for Ui,t ≤ 0 (3.2b)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s subjective discount factor and ̺ governs the degree of
household risk aversion5. The preference structure presented in (3.2) defines preferences
recursively as a function of current utility, Ui,t, and a certainty equivalent of future utility,
Et [Vt+1]. Crucially, as discussed by Swanson and Rudebusch (2012), (3.2) nests the special
case of expected utility preferences when ̺ = 0. Each household is constrained with respect






























































where Dt denotes nominal deposits held by the financial intermediary which, by assumption,
pay the return on government bonds, RNt,t+1. Holdings of j-period nominal Government,









j,t. Households also own and invest in
4As discussed in Epstein and Zin (1989), this assumption is necessary to avoid complex numbers.




where σγ governs the level of risk aversion. Since σc > 1 and assuming σγ > σc, higher values of σγ




shares of the wholesale firm6, the price and quantity of which are given by PEt and Ωt
respectively. Furthermore, households also receive a dividend, Dt, from holding equities.
Household labour is supplied at the real wage, Wt, and Tt denotes a lump-sum tax levied by
the Government. The solution to the household’s problem is defined as the maximised value
of (3.2) subject to the budget constraint (3.3)7.
3.2.2 Wage Setting
We assume the existence of a labour packer that aggregates differentiated household labour
to form an index of labour input to used by the entrepreneur. Labour is aggregated in












where εw denotes the elasticity of substitution among household labour. Maximisation of







Staggered wage setting is introduced à la Calvo (1983) so that each period each household
faces a constant probability, θw ∈ [0, 1], of being unable to re-optimise their wage rate. For












6The optimisation problem of the wholesale firm will be introduced later on.
7As discussed by Swanson (2017), the assumptions imposed on U(Ci,t, Hi,t) above in addition to the
conditions imposed under (3.2) guarantee the existence of a unique optimal choice for (Ct, Ht) at each point






denotes nominal price inflation, Π†t,t+1 denotes a time-varying inflation
target set by the Central bank and ιw ∈ [0, 1] controls the strength of indexation. For the
remaining fraction of households able to re-optimise their wage, Wi,t, do so by solving the





























































where λt+k is representative of the household’s marginal utility of consumption and ζ
w
t de-
notes a wage mark-up shock assumed to follow an ARMA(1,1) process.
3.2.3 Investment Good Producer (IGP)
The IGP uses a fraction of the final good, It, purchased from the retail firm to produce the











where ζ it denotes a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment and Φ (·) is an investment
adjustment cost function assumed to follow the formulation adopted by Christiano et al.
(2005)8. At the end of the each period the IGP sells the efficient investment good to the



























Entrepreneurs hire labour and capital services to produce the intermediate good, Yj,t, in








where ζat denotes a neutral TFP shock, Zt denotes capacity utilisation, Kt represents capital
services and G is representative of labour-augmenting technical progress. At the end of each
period, entrepreneurs purchase the investment good through a combination of net worth,
Nt, and external finance (provided by a financial intermediary) to subsequently accumulate
capital via the capital law of motion.










Following Greenwood et al. (1988) we introduce the depreciation function9 to capture the
notion that higher utilisation rates lead to faster depreciation of the capital stock. Crucially,
as Bernanke et al. (1999) show, the external financing cost will be priced at a spread over
the risk-free rate. The magnitude of this spread, the external finance premium (EFP), is
a decreasing function in the quantity of collateralised net worth as demonstrated in the
equation below.
RLt,t+1 = F (·)R
N
t,t+1 (3.11)
where the loan rate charged by the financial intermediary is denoted by RLt,t+1 and function









90 ≥ δ ≤ 1, δ′ > 0, δ′′ > 0
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where ψ captures the elasticity of the EFP to changes in the financial health of the en-
trepreneur. Implicit in (3.11) is an asymmetry of information problem in which the bank
cannot observe the productivity of the entrepreneur without incurring a cost. If the en-
trepreneur defaults on their loan, then the bank must pay a cost to audit the loan and
recover the outcome of the investment. A decrease in net worth, for example, increases the
entrepreneur’s incentive to misreport the outcome of the project translating into a riskier
loan book for the bank. Anticipating higher defaults and higher auditing costs, the bank
will now charge a higher loan rate because it still has to ensure that it is able to pay the
risk-free rate on household deposits.
The objective of the entrepreneur is to maximise their book value. For assets, the en-
trepreneur holds undepreciated capital valued at price Qt, plus the income received from
the production of output which it sells at cost, MCt. Liabilities include the costs associ-
ated with the loan contract in addition to the cost of renting labour services. Formally, the






























As in Bernanke et al. (1999), ϕ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the survival probability of entrepreneurs.
The assumption that entrepreneurs have a finite life is to ensure that entrepreneurial net
worth never becomes so large that external finance is not required. The law of motion for








+ (1− ϕ)Nt (3.13)
So that net worth in the current period will equal the current gross return on capital (pur-
chased in the previous period), RKt−1,t, minus the contractual rate (agreed in the previous
period) multiplied by the quantity borrowed. For those entrepreneurs exiting the economy,
105
Chapter 3
it is assumed that they transfer their resources to newly entering entrepreneurs in the form
of seed money denoted by Nt.
3.2.5 Retailer
The output of the retailer is packaged from a continuum of goods produced by wholesalers,












where εp denotes the elasticity of substitution among wholesaler output. Retailers, oper-
ating in perfectly competitive markets, seek to maximise profits subject to the technology









To facilitate aggregation, we assume that the wholesaler purchases output from the en-
trepreneur at cost, and subsequently differentiates the entrepreneur’s output without cost.
Furthermore, wholesalers sell their output in a monopolistically competitive market subject
to a Calvo (1983) constraint. For those wholesalers unable to re-optimise their price we













Those wholesalers able to re-optimise will pick a price consistent with maximising the fol-































where ζpt denotes a price mark-up shock that also follows an ARMA(1,1) process.
3.2.7 Government
Monetary policy is conducted through a Taylor-type rule which sees the Central bank respond






















Under this set-up, the Central bank attempts to minimise deviations between actual and
target inflation, Π†t−1,t. Following the formulation presented in Gürkaynak et al. (2005) the
law of motion for Π†t−1,t is presented below.










If ǫ > 0, then, consistent with the empirical evidence presented by Gürkaynak et al (2005),
long-term inflation expectations will respond to developments in current inflation and output.
Furthermore ζrt denotes a monetary policy shock.
Fiscal policy in our model constitutes exogenous government spending shocks which, in
contrast to Smets and Wouters (2007), do not respond to developments in TFP.
3.2.8 Asset Pricing
In pricing the assets under consideration, we exploit the recursive nature of the fundamen-
tal asset pricing equation central to the C-CAPM framework. For example, assuming no
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Following common convention we assume that upon maturity each real bond will pay one
unit of consumption. Exploiting the recursive nature of (3.20) we can price the entire real
















































































The nominal term structure can be recovered in exactly the same manner after making an















The Bernanke et al. (1999) framework provides a natural way to capture the risk of invest-
ing in corporate bonds relative to those of the Government. To price corporate bonds we



























For equities, we assume that the profits of the wholesale firm are paid out as dividends to
the household10. Dividends are therefore equal to the difference between the wholesale firm’s
expenditure and revenue:
Dt = Yt −MCt (3.26)








where the household’s stochastic discount factor, Λt,t+1, is used to discount future payoffs as






Consequently, the equity premium can then be computed by subtracting the one period real







The objective of this paper is to examine how the macroeconomy influences asset prices in
the presence of uncertainty. Such analyses are only meaningful by use of non-linear solution
techniques so that the joint roles of risk and uncertainty can be properly evaluated. Lin-
10This formulation is essentially the same as in De Paoli et al. (2010).
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earised models and the techniques used in their solution impose the certainty equivalence
principle implying that risk premia is restricted to zero. To permit a role for uncertainty, we
turn to the perturbation literature and solve our model numerically around the deterministic
steady state using the second-order approximation routines available in DYNARE11. The de-
terministic steady state being that point the economy will settle in the absence of exogenous
shocks and in which agents do not take into account the possibility of future shocks when
formulating their economic plans. In what follows, we provide a general overview of the
solution method paying particular attention into how uncertainty shifts the prices of assets
and gives rise to risk premia.
Our model may be represented by the stochastic vector function, F , which contains the
equilibrium conditions of the model economy.
EtF (ct+1, ct, st+1, st) = 0 (3.30)
Where ct is an nc x 1 vector containing the model’s control variables, st is a ns x 1 vector
containing the state variables such that the total variables, n, is equal to n = nc + ns.
Furthermore, st can be partitioned into the model’s endogenous and exogenous state variables





′. The assumption that all exogenous shocks follow AR(1) processes
implies that the vector s2t will evolve according to:
s2t+1 = Λs
2
t + η̂σεt+1 (3.31)
where η̂ is an ns2 x ns2 covariance matrix, σ denotes the perturbation parameter, εt is the
ns1 x 1 vector of innovations assumed to be iid with zero mean and covariance matrix I.
The solution we seek to (3.30) is of the form:
ct = ĝ(st, σ) (3.32)
11See Adjemian et al. (2011)
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A second order approximation of ĝ and ĥ around the deterministic steady state yields12:
[g(st, σ)]






































where i = 1, ..., nc, a, b = 1, ..., ns and j = 1, ..., ns
As discussed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) to ensure a unique solution to (3.30) we
must have gσ = hσ = 0 that is, to a first-order, the certainty-equivalence principle must
hold13. At a second-order approximation, however, the uncertainty in the economy shifts
the constants of the policy functions via correction terms14 to define the stochastic steady
state. Therefore in the stochastic steady state agents now take into account the possibility
of future shocks so that the correction terms are correcting for precautionary savings and
engendering risk premia for financial assets.
12The notation borrows heavily from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). For example the nc x ns matrix,
[cs], containing the first-order derivatives [cs]
i
a denotes the element corresponding to the intersection of the
ith row and ath column. For the nc x ns x ns three-dimensional array containing the second-order derivatives
[css]
i
ab corresponds to the intersection of the i
th row ,ath column and the bth layer.
13This condition must also hold for the cross derivatives i.e. gsσ = hsσ = 0. Intuitively, this implies that,
at a second-order approximation, the coefficients in the policy rules that are linear in the state vector are
independent of the covariance matrix of εt.




In this section, we examine the ability of our model to match the moments of US financial
and macroeconomic data. We first present results for our full model and subsequently shut
down key parameters to pin down the impact of various model features on macroeconomic
and financial moments.
3.4.1 Model Parametrisation and Data Description
To conduct our simulations we calibrate our model using parameters that are typical of those
found in tantamount studies, the values of which are reported in Table 3.1. For example,
we calibrate that subset of parameters typically associated with medium-scale models to the
mean of the posterior distribution estimated in Smets and Wouters (2007)15. Similarly, we
calibrate our exogenous processes to match the estimates obtained by these authours. Fol-
lowing Christensen and Dib (2008) we calibrate ψ to 0.042 and set the deterministic steady
state EFP to 1.0075 which corresponds to an annual corporate bond spread of 3%. Further-
more, we set the steady state level of leverage16 to 2. Consistent with the estimate obtained
by De Graeve (2008), we fix the probability of entrepreneurial survival, ϕ, to 0.9858. The
degree to which changes in recent inflation are transmitted through to the inflation target,
ǫ, is fixed to 0.02 consistent with the findings presented in Gürkaynak et al. (2005). Related,
we set the inflation reaction coefficient, φπ, to 1.5 which is slightly lower than the value
reported in Smets and Wouters (2007)17.
A key value to calibrate in our analysis is the Epstein-Zin parameter, ̺, which dictates the
degree of risk aversion. Since the equilibrium conditions of our model are identical to the
case of expected utility, estimating a non-linear DSGE model is required to identify the
15One exception is that we calibrate the consumption habit, γc, to the slightly higher value of 0.81. This
is to achieve a better fit for our model when matching macroeconomic moments.
16Defined as the ratio of capital to net worth.
17Our Taylor-rule, however, differs to that of Smets and Wouters (2007)) in two ways. First, we assume the
Central bank attempts to minimise the gap between current and target inflation. Secondly, we assume the
Central bank responds to deviations in output from its previous value as opposed to its flex-price analogue.
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higher-order effects that are crucial for risk premia that Epstein and Zin preferences intro-
duce. Consequently, there are few studies to provide estimates of the Epstein-Zin parameter
since, as discussed by Van Binsbergen et al. (2012), estimating non-linear DSGE models is
computationally challenging, forcing the researcher to make a compromise between theoret-
ical detail and empirical relevance. For example, Andreasen (2012) estimates a third-order
approximation of a simple DSGE model on both macro and interest rate data and obtains a
value of -183. Swanson and Rudebusch (2012) also consider a simple DSGE model but opt
for a different estimation strategy by using grid search. Conditional on their model hitting
100 basis points of term premia, Swanson and Rudebusch (2012) report a range of -148 for ̺.
Paries and Loublier (2010) consider a medium scale model and find that in order to match
historical estimates of term premia their model requires a value of -930 for ̺. Our calibration
strategy loosely follows Paries and Loublier (2010) in that we set ̺ to -52518 in order to hit
a term spread of 143 basis points19.
In order to assess the empirical validity of our model, we compare simulated moments from
our model against US data. Output, Y , is measured as real GDP available at the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA). To construct our consumption series, C, we take personal
consumption expenditures from the BEA and deflate it by the GDP deflator, also available
from the BEA. Similarly, for investment, I, we take fixed private investment from the BEA
and deflate it by the GDP deflator. Hours, H, is defined as total hours in the non-farm
business sector and can be accessed via the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The real wage
series, W , is constructed by deflating hourly compensation in the non-farm business sector
which is also available at the BLS. We take the natural log of Y ,C, I, H and W and then
take the first-difference of each series to compute the standard deviation relative to that of
output. Our data for these series is quarterly and spans from 1960:1 - 2007:1. For inflation,
Π, we take the change in the quarterly GDP price index expressed at an annual rate from
18Since it is difficult to estimate this parameter directly, our calibration strategy implies that we are picking
a value for ̺ in order to fit the data as opposed to explaining the data which would require us to estimate ̺
directly.
19Since this is the historical average for the term spread computed over our sample.
113
Chapter 3
the BEA. Our policy rate, RN , is constructed using the end-of-month federal funds rate
from the Federal Reserve Board expressed at an annual rate. We construct our term spread
series, YN40 − R
N , by subtracting the 3-month Treasury bill rate from the 10-year Treasury
bond rate. Each series can be accessed from the Federal Reserve Board and Gürkaynak et al.
(2007) respectively. We follow Swanson and Rudebusch (2012) who opt for using the raw
series of Π, RN and YN40 −Y
N
1 to compute standard deviations as opposed to using filtered
series. For the credit spread, YC40 −Y
N
40, we take Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield relative
to the yield on the 10-Year Treasury expressed at an annual rate. Since the market for
sub-investment grade bonds prior to the 1980s was not particularly well developed (Gertler
and Lown, 1999), our data series for the credit spread reflects this and spans the slightly
shorter period of 1986:1 - 2007:1. Moments for the real risk-free rate, YR1 , and the real re-
turn on equities, RE, are taken directly from Nezafat and Slavik (2009)20 who compute the
respective means and standard deviations for these series using US quarterly data spanning
1964:1 - 2008:4.
3.4.2 Full Model
The results of our full model simulation are reported in the third column of Table 3.2,
several results are worth pointing out. First, through calibrating ̺, our model is not only
able to replicate the level of term spread but it also performs adequately in matching its
standard deviation. Interestingly, calibrating our model with a bias towards fitting the
term spread does not appear to hinder its ability to explain other interest rate series. For
instance, our model performs well in matching the moments of the credit spread, albeit
slightly over-predicting both the mean and standard deviation. Similarly, the mean and
standard deviation computed for the real risk free rate are reasonably close to the values
found in the data.
For equities, the mean return implied by our model understates that of the data by 427 basis




points, indicative of a poor fit in this area. Consequently, we also observe that our benchmark
model performs poorly in matching the excess return on equities, RE −YR1 . Moreover, the
standard deviation that we compute for equities is less than 6 times the amount reported
in the data, denoting a clear area of discrepancy between our model and the data. From
a theoretical perspective, Hördahl et al. (2008) argues that the inability of DSGE models
to match equity moments may not represent a source of misspecification. Indeed, these
authours suggest that the price of equities are often be driven by factors disconnected from
the real economy - information acquisition, bubbles etc. Indeed, Miao et al. (2015) show
that in the case of the US, non-fundamentals in the form of bubbles are an important
driver in US stock market fluctuations during the post-war period. The pricing of bonds,
however, should largely reflect the future path of monetary policy which is arguably more
predictable21 than the future profitability of firms that is crucial for pricing equities. We
therefore take confidence in that our model does a reasonable job in matching various bond
moments despite performing poorly in its attempt to explain equity moments.
Finally, turning to the macroeconomic series and, perhaps unsurprisingly, our model performs
adequately in matching both the relative standard deviation of real aggregates and the
standard deviation of inflation and the nominal interest rate.
3.4.3 Expected Utility Preferences
In order to evaluate the role played by Epstein-Zin preferences, we set ̺ = 0 so that our
benchmark results can be contrasted with those that would pertain under the case of ex-
pected utility. The fourth column of Table 3.2 presents the results of this exercise. Our first
observation is that the standard deviation of all series is left unaffected under the instance
of expected utility preferences. Indeed, Van Binsbergen et al. (2012) show that, to a second-
order approximation, the decision rules computed under Epstein-Zin and expected utility




preferences differ by only a constant22. As such, the impact of using Epstein-Zin preferences
will only be realised through analysing the stochastic averages of financial assets, a matter
we now turn to. Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 present the implications for the respective means of
the term spread, credit spread and equity premium by varying the Epstein-Zin parameter.
From Figure 3.1, both the one quarter and 40 quarter nominal spot rates are increasing with
higher levels of risk aversion. The long spot rate, however, increases at a faster rate causing
the term spread to increase with higher levels of risk aversion. To provide insight into our
results it is instructive to examine the impulse response functions of variables key to the
pricing of nominal bonds. Figure 3.4 presents the impulse response functions of the stochas-
tic discount factor (SDF), inflation and the prices of the 40 quarter real and nominal bonds
in response to those innovations jointly responsible for the majority of fluctuations in our
model: TFP, Government spending and monetary policy shocks. In the interest of brevity,
we discuss only the impulses pertaining to the TFP shock, although the other shocks imply
similar co-movements for the variables of interest. Through the wealth effect, the decrease
in TFP lowers current consumption causing the stochastic discount factor to increase. Fur-
thermore, through its impact on marginal costs, the fall in TFP also implies higher inflation
which erodes the real value of the nominal bond’s pay-off and therefore causes its price to
fall. Since the nominal bond loses value at a time when additional consumption is greatly
valued, it is considered risky and therefore rational agents will demand risk premia for hold-
ing such bonds. Naturally, the quantity of term premia demanded will be increasing in the
level of risk aversion, which is what we observe in Figure 3.1.
Turning to the credit spread and we observe from Figure 3.2 that both the 40 quarter Cor-
porate and Government yields are increasing with higher levels of risk aversion. Since the
Government yield increases at a faster rate, this implies that the credit spread is decreas-
ing in the level of risk aversion. Of obvious importance when analysing corporate bonds is
the response of the external finance premium, as this determines the spread over the cor-
22Consequently, impulse response functions of endogenous variables will be unaffected by varying the
Epstein-Zin parameter upto a second-order approximation.
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responding Government bond. Focussing on the first column of Figure 3.5 and, in contrast
to Bernanke et al. (1999), we observe that the external finance premium actually decreases
in response to a negative TFP shock. Responsible, is the fact that our formulation features
a contractual rate specified in nominal terms rather than one expressed in real terms as
in Bernanke et al. (1999). Our model therefore permits a channel for shifts in unexpected
inflation to alter the real debt-burden. To illustrate this point, the second row of Figure
3.5 plots both the contractual rate (specified in real terms) and the gross return to capital.
Whilst we observe that both rates fall on impact of the TFP shock, the loan rate falls by
relatively more such that the gap between these two rates represents a flow of unexpected
profits for the entrepreneur which boosts their net worth and in turn lowers the external
finance premium. For the corporate bond, due to higher inflation, we also observe a fall in
price implying that corporate bonds are also risky and will therefore command risk premia in
a similar manner to Government bonds. However, relative to the Government bond, the fall
in the external finance premium implies that the corporate bond retains more value causing
the credit spread to be decreasing in the level of risk aversion.
Figure 3.3 reveals that the equity return, risk-free rate and the equity premium are all de-
creasing in the level of risk aversion. The decline in the risk-free rate is indicative of agents
bidding up the price of the risk-free asset through the desire to precautionary save. To
provide insight into the behaviour of the equity return, Figure 3.6 plots the responses of
the equity value and dividend to a negative monetary policy shock23. The cut in interest
rates not only boosts the equity value but also increases the level of dividends received by
the household. Relative to nominal assets which lose value in a high-inflation state, equities
offer security in that both their price and dividend increase. Agents are therefore willing to
except a lower return on equities in exchange for the insurance that they provide.
The results in this section demonstrate the appeal of using Epstein-Zin preferences in that
they are able to bring our model much closer to matching the moments of financial vari-




ables without distorting the fit of key macroeconomic series. In this regard, our results are
supportive of the similar conclusions reached by Tallarini (2000), Backus et al. (2007) and
Swanson and Rudebusch (2012).
3.4.4 Financial Accelerator Effects
In this subsection we assess the importance of the financial accelerator on macro and financial
moments by setting ψ = 0. The fifth column in Table 3.2 reveals that by switching off
financial accelerator effects we observe a clear deterioration in fit for the majority of our
macro series, particularly for the nominal series. In this regard, we compliment the literature
which has shown that including a credit market friction can improve the fit of macro variables
(Christensen and Dib, 2008; De Graeve, 2008; Merola, 2015). Furthermore, our results also
suggest that the inclusion of the financial accelerator significantly improves the fit of bond
moments.
Focussing first on the implications for nominal Government bond yields, Figure 3.7 reveals
that the term spread is increasing as the strength of the financial accelerator is raised, since
the 40 quarter nominal spot rate is increasing at a faster rate relative to the 1 quarter nominal
spot rate. Similarly, inspection of impulse response functions yields great insight behind
our results. Figure 3.10, for example, reports the respective impulse response functions as
the strength of the financial accelerator is raised. Focussing once more on those impulses
pertaining to the negative TFP shock, we observe that as ψ is increased, there is little
impact on the response of the stochastic discount factor. The inflation response, however,
does exhibit amplification in light of greater financial accelerator effects. This is because
the credit market friction in our model actually decelerates the impact of the negative TFP
shock. Recall that a negative shock to TFP effects a fall in the external finance premium
which not only limits the initial drop in investment but also serves to support a recovery in
both investment and output. Consequently, the fall in aggregate demand is attenuated as
we raise the strength of the credit market friction, hence the higher levels of inflation. The
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implication for nominal-bond holders is that higher inflation leads to correspondingly larger
losses in capital value and thus prompts investors to demand greater levels of risk-premia.
Turning now to corporate bonds, we see observe from Figure 3.8 that the credit spread is
decreasing in ψ since the corporate yield increases at a slower rate relative to the Government
yield. Figure 3.11 reports the impact on the corporate bond price as the strength of the
financial accelerator is increased. It is important to note that as ψ is increased, net worth is
raised via a reduction in the real debt burden. We illustrate this point in the first column and
first row of Figure 3.11 which plots the gap between the capital return and the contractual
rate. As discussed, a positive gap corresponds to a transfer of profits to the entrepreneur
which raises their net worth. Furthermore, by raising ψ we also increase the extent to which
changes in net worth are transmitted through to the external finance premium24. Both
effects serve to lower the external finance premium and the corresponding spread over the
Government bond. The implication for the corporate bond price is that as we raise ψ the
loss of capital value associated with higher inflation is, to a large extent, being offset by
falls in the external finance premium. As such, the corporate bond is still perceived as risky
since its price decreases, but the loss in value is still smaller relative to the loss in value
characterising the Government bond. Consequently, the credit spread is decreasing as the
strength of the financial accelerator is increased.
Figure 3.9 reports the implications for the risk free rate, the equity return and the equity
premium as the strength of the credit market friction is varied. For the risk-free rate,
analysis of Figure 3.10 reveals that, particularly for the Government spending and monetary
policy shocks, higher levels of ψ have the effect of amplifying the response of the stochastic
discount factor. Of course, greater volatility in the stochastic discount factor is a pre-
cursor for precautionary savings which explains why the risk-free rate is decreasing in ψ.
To understand the equity return, we focus on the monetary policy shock and present the




The dividend received from holding equities is increasing in ψ. Relative to the nominal
assets which lose correspondingly more value when the strength of the financial accelerator
is increased, holding equities provides investors with dividend income. As such, investors
will therefore accept a lower return on equities as ψ is raised due to the additional insurance
provided25 implying that equities offer an increasingly effective hedge against inflation as
we strengthen the effect of the financial accelerator. Investors will therefore accept a lower
return on equities as ψ is raised due to the additional insurance provided. Since the risk-free
rate decreases at a faster rate relative to the equity return, the equity premium is increasing
in the strength of the credit market friction.
3.4.5 Long-Run Inflation Risk
A key finding of Swanson and Rudebusch (2012) is that the inclusion of both long-run
risk and Epstein-Zin preferences is crucial to their model’s ability to generate sufficient risk
premia in nominal bonds. Their results, however, are sensitive to the nature of long-run risk
assumed, since each form of risk will imply different implications for the covariance between
consumption and inflation. For example, the inclusion of long-run productivity risk in the
spirit of Bansal and Yaron (2004) is shown to lower the nominal term premium since it lowers
the negative correlation between consumption and inflation in their model. By contrast,
the introduction of long-run inflation risk via a time-varying inflation target systematically
increases the negative correlation between consumption and inflation thus generating higher
term premia. In our paper, the notion of long-run inflation risk constitutes both a time-
varying inflation target a la Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and a relatively low inflation reaction
coefficient.
We first turn our attention to assessing the significance of long-run inflation risk on the
25Although the initial response of dividends is increasing in ψ, we subsequently observe a faster reversion
back to steady state for the equity value as ψ in increased. This is indicative of the financial accelerator
propagating the monetary policy shock causing the Central bank to tighten policy relatively faster in order
to stabilise the economy (see Figure 3.10). Consequently, it is the expectation of higher interest rates which
begins to choke off the impact of the initial loosening of policy causing the equity price to tend towards
steady state relatively faster.
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moments of our macro series. It is clear from Table 3.2 that the inclusion of inflation risk
significantly improves the fit of the model-implied inflation and the nominal interest rate
series. In the absence of inflation risk, the standard deviations of these nominal variables
understate the data by over 1 percentage point. Interestingly, however, we find that on
the real side of the economy we observe a slight worsening in fit for the relative standard
deviation of the hours and investment series by introducing long-run inflation risk into our
model.
Turning to the financial series, Figure 3.13 plots the implications for the term spread as the
magnitude of inflation risk is varied. With greater inflation risk, the term spread and the
yields on both the 1 and 40 quarter bonds are all increasing. Similar to before, we now provide
insight into our results by discussing the impulse responses pertaining to a negative TFP
shock. Impulse responses for various levels of inflation risk are reported in Figure 3.16. With
ǫ > 0, the Central bank responds to the TFP shock by gradually raising the inflation target.
Since agents incorporate the increase in the inflation target when formulating their price and
wage setting decisions, the response of inflation is amplified as ǫ is increased. Related, is the
simultaneous lowering of the inflation reaction coefficient since it ensures that the Central
bank somewhat facilitates the increase in inflation variability by being more passive in its
policy stance. As a result, higher inflation risk translates into larger losses of capital value
for the nominal bond investor via higher levels of inflation. As such, investors demand a
higher quantity of risk premia for holing nominal Government bonds in the face of greater
inflation risk.
For the credit spread, Figure 3.14 reveals that as the degree of inflation risk is raised, the
yield on the Government bond increases at a faster rate relative to the corporate bond,
implying that the credit spread is decreasing with higher levels of inflation risk. From the
first column of Figure 3.17, we observe that, similar to the Government bond, the price of
the corporate bond falls in the face of higher inflation implied by a negative TFP shock.
However, the additional inflation also reduces the real debt burden and provides a boost
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to the net worth of entrepreneurs. As a result, the fall in the external finance premium
attenuates the corporate bond’s loss of value and thus provides a structural interpretation
of why the credit spread is decreasing as the level of inflation risk is increased.
Finally, we now discuss the impact of long-run inflation risk on the stochastic mean of the
equity premium. Figure 3.15 indicates that the risk-free rate is decreasing in the level of
inflation risk. As can be seen in Figure 3.16, the volatility of the stochastic discount factor is
clearly increasing as the degree of inflation risk is increased. Consequently, agents increase
their precautionary savings causing the yield on the risk-free rate to fall in equilibrium.
Regarding the equity return, Figure 3.18 plots the responses of the equity price and dividend
to an expansionary monetary policy shock. As made clear by the figure, the initial responses
of the equity value and dividends are both increasing as the the level of long-run inflation
risk is raised. Investors therefore perceive equities as a safe investment as they offer an
effective hedge against higher inflation. This explains why both the equity return and the
equity premium are both decreasing as we instil greater inflation risk into our model.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper has revisited the ability of the workhorse New Keynesian DSGE model to jointly
replicate both macroeconomic and financial moments. Our central result is that by append-
ing the Smets and Wouters (2007) model with Epstein-Zin preferences, a financial accelerator
and long-run inflation risk, we are able to successfully match bond yield moments without
compromising the fit of key macroeconomic series. In matching the stochastic means of
financial assets, our results are particularly dependent on the use of Epstein-Zin preferences
in order to generate sufficient risk premia and precautionary savings. Our findings are of
particular interest to the bond-pricing literature in that we show how the introduction of
Epstein-Zin preferences into an empirically relevant DSGE model offers a flexible approach
to yielding sizeable term premia. In this regard, our results may be seen as an extension to
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the analysis of Swanson and Rudebusch (2012).
This paper has also demonstrated how the inclusion of a financial accelerator can bring these
class of models closer to matching both macroeconomic and financial data. While the impli-
cations of financial frictions on macroeconomic series are well documented, research has been
relatively less active in documenting the ramifications for fitting bond prices by modelling
a credit market friction. The contribution of our analysis is to show how a financial friction
may be used to generate realistic implications for term premia whilst also leading to im-
provements in matching the relative standard deviations of macroeconomic aggregates. The
principle mechanism behind this result, is that the financial friction systematically increases
the covariance between the stochastic discount factor and nominal bond price thus leading
investors to demand greater quantities of term premia.
By a similar mechanism, we find long-run inflation risk to also be an important determinant
in generating a realistic quantity of term premia, since it also raises the covariance between
the pricing kernel and nominal bond price. Moreover, inflation risk is also key in bringing
our model closer to matching the standard deviation of inflation and the nominal interest
rate. On the real side of the economy, however, we find the inclusion of inflation-risk to be
of limited significance in matching the relative standard deviations of those aggregates of
interest.
One area in which our model performs particularly poorly, is its inability to match the ex-
cessive volatility of stock returns returns found in the data. In light of a growing literature
subscribing to the view that non-fundamentals are an important determinant in driving stock
price fluctuations, we attribute this result to the assumption that stock prices are explained
entirely by market fundamentals in our model.
While this paper has examined the interaction between the economy and asset prices, such
interactions have been strictly unidirectional, in that we focus exclusively on how the macroe-
conomy influences risk premia. Consequently, our analysis is silent about any potential feed-
back effects from changes in risk premia to the macroeconomy. An interesting avenue for
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future research could explore how the financial accelerator present in this paper could be
extended so that changes in not only macroeconomic conditions but also risk premia are




Table 3.1: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Description Value Source
β Subjective discount factor 0.9984 Smets & Wouters (2007)
Π Steady state inflation (gross) 1.0078 Smets & Wouters (2007)
G Trend growth (gross) 1.0043 Smets & Wouters (2007)
γc Consumption habit 0.81
σc Inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 1.370 Smets & Wouters (2007)
σh Labour elasticity 1.830 Smets & Wouters (2007)
̺ Epstein-Zin parameter -499
εw Wage elasticity of substitution 10
ιw Wage indexation 0.24 Smets & Wouters (2007)
θw Calvo wage 0.70 Smets & Wouters (2007)
Φ
′′
Investment adjustment costs 5.74 Smets & Wouters (2007)
α Capital share 0.19 Smets & Wouters (2007)
F Steady state EFP 1.0075 Christensen & Dib (2008)
ψ External finance premium elasticity 0.042 Christensen & Dib (2008)
ϕ Entrepreneur survival rate 0.9858 De Graeve (2008)
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025 Smets & Wouters (2007)
σz Utilisation adjustment cost 0.54
εp Price elasticity of substitution 10
ιp Price indexation 0.58 Smets & Wouters (2007)
θp Calvo price 0.66 Smets & Wouters (2007)
g Govt’ share of output 0.18 Smets & Wouters (2007)
ιr Taylor rule - smoothing 0.81 Smets & Wouters (2007)
φπ Taylor rule - inflation 1.5
φy Taylor rule - output 0.08 Smets & Wouters (2007)
ǫ target inflation 0.02 Gurkaynak et al (2005)
ρb AR(1) preference shock 0.22 Smets & Wouters (2007)
ρw AR(1) wage mark-up shock 0.96 Smets & Wouters (2007)
ρi AR(1) investment shock 0.71 Smets & Wouters (2007)
ρa AR(1) tfp shock 0.95 Smets & Wouters (2007)
ρp AR(1) price mark-up shock 0.89 Smets & Wouters (2007)
ρg AR(1) govt’ spending shock 0.97 Smets & Wouters (2007)
ρag AR(1) tfp/govt 0.52 Smets & Wouters (2007)
ρm AR(1) monetary policy shock 0.15 Smets & Wouters (2007)
Θw MA(1) wage mark-up shock 0.84 Smets & Wouters (2007)
Θp MA(1) price mark-up shock 0.69 Smets & Wouters (2007)
σb Std. Dev. preference shock 0.0023 Smets & Wouters (2007)
σw Std. Dev. wage mark-up shock 0.0024 Smets & Wouters (2007)
σi Std. Dev. investment shock 0.0045 Smets & Wouters (2007)
σa Std. Dev. tfp shock 0.0045 Smets & Wouters (2007)
σp Std. Dev. price mark-up shock 0.0014 Smets & Wouters (2007)
σg Std. Dev. govt’ spending shock 0.0053 Smets & Wouters (2007)
σm Std. Dev. monetary policy shock 0.0024 Smets & Wouters (2007)
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Table 3.2: Model-Implied and Empirical Descriptive Statistics
Unconditional Moment US Economy Full Model EU Pref. No FA No LR Inflation Risk
Macro moments
Rel. S.D. [C] 0.80 0.92 0.92 1.20 0.99
Rel. S.D. [I] 2.51 3.63 3.63 2.63 3.49
Rel. S.D. [H] 0.74 1.01 1.01 0.89 0.81
Rel. S.D. [W ] 0.67 0.63 0.63 0.78 0.78
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Notes: a. Model-implied moments were obtained by simulating our model for 100,000 replications.




Figure 3.1: Mean Nominal Term Premium for Various Levels of Risk Aversion
̺


















Notes: The figure reports the mean values for the 40 quarter nominal Government spot rate, 1 quarter
nominal Government spot rate and the term spread (TS) implied by our model for various levels of risk
aversion. All yields are expressed at an annual rate.
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Figure 3.2: Mean Credit Spread for Various Levels of Risk Aversion
̺


















Notes: The figure reports the mean values for the 40 quarter nominal Government spot rate, 40 quarter
nominal corporate spot rate and the credit spread (CS) implied by our model for various levels of risk
aversion. All yields are expressed at an annual rate.
Figure 3.3: Mean Equity Premium for Various Levels of Risk Aversion
̺



















Notes: The figure reports the mean values for the quarterly equity return, quarterly real risk-free rate and
the equity premium (EP) implied by our model for various levels of risk aversion. All yields are expressed
at an annual rate.
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Notes: The first, second and third columns report impulse response functions to a negative TFP shock, a
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Figure 3.6: Impulse Response Functions: ζrt ↓
Quarters
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Notes: Presented are impulse response functions to a negative monetary policy shock. The y-axis denotes
percentage deviations from the non-stochastic steady state and the x-axis denotes the quarters elapsed
following the shock.
Figure 3.7: Mean Nominal Term Premium for Various Levels of Financial Accelerator Effects
ψ

















Notes: The figure reports the mean values for the 40 quarter nominal Government spot rate, 1 quarter
nominal Government spot rate and the term spread (TS) implied by our model for various levels of financial
accelerator effects. All yields are expressed at an annual rate.
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Figure 3.8: Mean Nominal Credit Spread for Various Levels of Financial Accelerator Effects
ψ


















Notes: The figure reports the mean values for the 40 quarter nominal Government spot rate, 40 quarter
nominal corporate spot rate and the credit spread (CS) implied by our model for various levels of financial
accelerator effects. All yields are expressed at an annual rate.
Figure 3.9: Mean Equity Premium for Various Levels of Financial Accelerator Effects
ψ















Notes: The figure reports the mean values for the quarterly equity return, quarterly real risk-free rate and
the equity premium (EP) implied by our model for various levels of financial accelerator effects. All yields
are expressed at an annual rate.
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Notes: The first, second and third columns report impulse response functions to a negative TFP shock, a
positive Government spending shock and a negative monetary policy shock respectively. The y-axis denotes
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Notes: The first, second and third columns report impulse response functions to a negative TFP shock, a
positive Government spending shock and a negative monetary policy shock respectively. The y-axis denotes




Figure 3.12: Impulse Response Functions: ζrt ↓
Quarters













Dividend: -ve MON    
Notes: Presented are impulse response functions to a negative monetary policy shock. The y-axis denotes
percentage deviations from the non-stochastic steady state and the x-axis denotes the quarters elapsed
following the shock.
Figure 3.13: Mean Nominal Term Premium for Various Levels of Long-Run Inflation Risk
(φπ|ǫ)

















Notes: The figure reports the mean values for the 40 quarter nominal Government spot rate, 1 quarter
nominal Government spot rate and the term spread (TS) implied by our model for various levels of long-run
inflation risk. All yields are expressed at an annual rate.
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Figure 3.14: Mean Nominal Credit Spread for Various Levels of Long-Run Inflation Risk
(φπ|ǫ)


















Notes: The figure reports the mean values for the 40 quarter nominal Government spot rate, 40 quarter
nominal corporate spot rate and the credit spread (CS) implied by our model for various levels of long-run
inflation risk. All yields are expressed at an annual rate.
Figure 3.15: Mean Equity Premium for Various Levels of Long-Run Inflation Risk
(φπ|ǫ)



















Notes: The figure reports the mean values for the quarterly equity return, quarterly real risk-free rate and
the equity premium (EP) implied by our model for various levels of long-run inflation risk. All yields are
expressed at an annual rate.
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Figure 3.18: Impulse Response Functions: ζrt ↓
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3.A Stationary Non-Linear System
















































where β̄ = βG−σc
























































































































































































































































Q = 1 (SS1)
From 20.
Z = 1 (SS2)
From 30.
W = 1 (SS3)
From 11.
M = 1 (SS4)
From 30.
p∗ = 1 (SS5)
From 31.
∆p = 1 (SS6)




























































































































With K it is straightforward to solve for the remaining steady state values.
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Schmitt-Grohé, S. and Uribe, M. (2012), ‘What’s news in business cycles’, Econometrica
80(6), 2733–2764.
Smets, F. and Tsatsaronis, K. (1997), ‘Why does the yield curve predict economic activity?
dissecting the evidence for germany and the united states’.
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2007), ‘Shocks and frictions in us business cycles: A bayesian
dsge approach’, The American Economic Review 97(3), 586–606.
Staiger, D., Stock, J. H. and Watson, M. W. (2001), ‘Prices, wages and the us nairu in the
1990s’, National Bureau of Economic Research .
Stock, J. and Watson, M. (1989), ‘New indexes of coincident and leading economic indica-
tors’, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1989, Volume 4 pp. 351–409.
156
Chapter 3
Swanson, E. T. (2017), ‘Risk aversion, risk premia, and the labor margin with generalized
recursive preferences’, Review of Economic Dynamics .
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1094202517300820
Swanson, G. D. R. E. T. and Rudebusch, G. D. (2012), ‘The bond premium in a dsge
model with long-run real and nominal risks’, American Economic Journal: Macroeco-
nomics 4(1), 1–5.
Tallarini, T. D. (2000), ‘Risk-sensitive real business cycles’, Journal of monetary Economics
45(3), 507–532.
Taylor, J. (1999), ‘An historical analysis of monetary policy rules’, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (6768).
Tovar, C. (2008), ‘Dsge models and central banks’, BIS Working Papers .
Van Binsbergen, J. H., Fernández-Villaverde, J., Koijen, R. S. and Rubio-Ramı́rez, J. (2012),
‘The term structure of interest rates in a dsge model with recursive preferences’, Journal
of Monetary Economics pp. 634–648.
Weil, P. (1990), ‘Nonexpected utility in macroeconomics’, The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 105(1), 29–42.
Wheelock, D. C., Wohar, M. E. et al. (2009), ‘Can the term spread predict output growth
and recessions? a survey of the literature’, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 91(5
Part 1), 419–440.
Wright, J. H. (2011), ‘Term premia and inflation uncertainty: Empirical evidence from an
international panel dataset’, The American Economic Review 101(4), 1514–1534.
157
